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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Google Inc. (“Google“) announced to its shareholders 
that it would commit approximately one percent of the value of its 
equity to charitable endeavors.
1
  It formed a 501(c)(3) corporate 
charity, the Google Foundation, to carry out these activities.
2
  Subse-
quently, Google announced that it would not pursue the majority of 
its charitable work through its charitable foundation, but instead 
would act through a for-profit operating division, Google.org.
3
  The 
federal tax code has granted tax benefits to charitable organizations 
for almost a hundred years.
4
  Generally, an organization must meet 
two fundamental requirements to receive these tax benefits.  First, it 
must be “operated for a good purpose”; and second, it may not dis-
tribute its profits to any private persons.
5
  Google decided that it was 
worthwhile to forego the charitable tax benefits that may be available 
in order to pursue the first requirement (operating for a “good pur-
pose”) without being constrained by the second (refraining from dis-
tributing profits).  This decision was met with a mixed reaction in the 
press and in the scholarly community.
6
  But at least some scholars re-
 
 1 Google Inc., Amendment No. 9, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at A-14 
(Aug. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds1a.htm
#toc59330_25a  
 2 Id. 
 3 Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without 
Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 87–88 
(2008). 
 4 Generally, this Article discusses “charitable” organizations, which refers to 
those organizations devoted to functions that would enable them to meet the pur-
poses requirement of § 501(c)(3) of the federal income tax code.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c)(3) (2006).  “Tax benefits” include the exemption of income for charitable 
organizations, which was part of the Income Tax Act of 1913, and the deduction for 
contributions to charitable organizations, which was enacted in 1917.  Revenue Act 
of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); 
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 71–77 (2006)).  
 5 See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. 
TAX REV. 1, 12–13 (2011) (“The two core statutory requirements of the 1913 exemp-
tion are unchanged: charitable exemption still (of course) requires a ‘good’ purpose 
(and in general statutory law does not attempt to quantify the purpose); and the ex-
emption still is conditioned on the private inurement restriction.”).  Since 1913 a 
host of additional restrictions have been placed on charitable organizations, but the-
se two remain fundamental to all charities.  See, e.g., id. at 11–13. 
 6 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and the Promise of For-Profit Phi-
lanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 100 (2007); Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s 
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acted favorably, arguing that the restrictions imposed on charities 
under current law—most fundamentally the so-called “non-
distribution constraint,” which is what makes a charity “nonprofit”—
unnecessarily impede charitable work.
7
   
The most dramatic proposal came from Anup Malani and Eric 
Posner, who argued that current law should be changed.  Instead of 
requiring charities to assume a nonprofit form as a precondition of 
receiving tax benefits, such tax benefits should be available to for-
profit firms if they operate for a “charitable” purpose.
8
  Malani and 
Posner asked: If a for-profit operating division of a for-profit corpora-
tion could do the very same good works that a nonprofit charity 
could do—in Google’s case develop products that promote world-
wide health and energy sustainability—then what is the justification 
for denying tax benefits to it?
9
  Absent a compelling justification for 
“coupling” tax benefits with the non-distribution constraint, should 
not the two things be “de-coupled”?
10
  Malani and Posner examine 
what they identify as the leading justifications for tax subsidies in the 
charitable sector and argue that none of them successfully justifies re-
serving such benefits exclusively for nonprofit charities, denying 
them to so-called for-profit charities.
11
 
 
Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A6; Jennifer Lee, A Charity with an 
Unusual Interest in the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F1.  Among other 
things, once Google has chosen to forego tax-exempt status, there is arguably noth-
ing in the law to keep it to its promise to devote its funds to a “good purpose.”   
 7 See, e.g., Christopher Lim, Google.org, For Profit Charitable Entity: Another Smart 
Decision by Google, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28 (2007); Rana, supra note 3, at 93; Dana 
Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2454 (2009).  
 8 Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 
2065 (2007); see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and 
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009) (“[T]he government 
should eliminate tax discrimination between producers of altruism.”).  More than a 
decade before Malani and Posner’s article appeared, Evelyn Brody ominously pro-
posed that, “unless nonprofits can more sharply distinguish themselves from for-
profits . . . society might prefer to subsidize charitable and other social outputs pro-
duced by all organizations rather than subsidize nonprofits based on their organiza-
tional form.”  Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Form, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 (1996). 
 9 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2031. 
 10 Id. at 2029. 
 11 Id. at 2029–56.  The federal tax benefit that this Article focuses on is the de-
ductibility of contributions, and therefore consideration of exemption from the cor-
porate tax is beyond the scope of this Article.  Malani and Posner argue that contrib-
utors to for-profit firms that do “good work” should be permitted to deduct their 
contributions.  Id. at 2029.  But instances of contributions to for-profit firms doing 
charitable work are relatively rare (though not unheard of).  Malani and Posner pro-
pose that, in addition to a deduction for “pure” contributions, a purchase of a con-
sumer good from a firm that does good deeds should result in a partial deduction to 
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It is not just Google that has questioned whether the nonprofit 
form is the best way to structure firms that purport to promote the 
common good.  In just the last few years, a growing number of states 
have enacted legislation to enable “hybrid” entities to be created: for-
profit firms devoted to more than just a financial bottom line.
12
  The-
se hybrid legal forms are justified at least partially as a response to the 
overly restrictive nature of nonprofit law generally, and the “non-
distribution constraint” particularly.
13
  So far, none of these states has 
enacted tax benefits for the new hybrid entities, but it is likely that tax 
benefits are not far off.
14
 
Malani and Posner’s article provides a potential justification for 
future reformers’ intent to re-fashion laws restricting the ability of 
charitable organizations to take a profit.  While several commentators 
have criticized Malani and Posner’s article on various grounds,
15
 none 
has systematically offered a counter-theory explaining why the “cou-
 
the extent that the purchase price exceeds the “quality adjusted price” of goods with 
no charity component.  See id. at 2063.  These purchases of “good works” goods are 
presumably more common than outright donations to for-profit firms, but they im-
plicate valuation issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.  
 12 To date, eight states have passed legislation permitting the creation of a “low-
profit limited liability company” (“L3C”): Michigan, Vermont, Illinois, Wyoming, 
Utah, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Maine.  805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2011); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-2c-412 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102 (West 2010).  Legislation per-
mitting the creation of so-called “benefit corporations” has passed in seven states: 
California, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Virginia.  State by 
State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-
by-state-legislative-status (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).  Similar legislation is pending in 
eight others: Colorado, Louisiana, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Washington D.C.  Id.  In addition, California has enacted the 
“flexible purpose corporation.”  See S.B. 201, 2011—2012 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(Ca. 2012).  For an overview of hybrid social-enterprise legal forms, see Thomas Kel-
ley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009). 
 13 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 
35 VT. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (explaining that “blended” legal forms have arisen 
partially because traditional charities are prevented from distributing their profits to 
shareholders). 
 14 Philadelphia has recently become the first jurisdiction in the country to enact a 
tax benefit for “benefit corporations,” even though Pennsylvania has not yet enacted 
a statute permitting their creation. See PHILADELPHIA., PA., BUSINESS PRIVILEGE TAXES, 
PHILA. CODE 19-2600 (2009).    
 15 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Response: Keeping Republicans Republican, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
235 (2010); see also Victor Fleischer, “For-Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231 (2008); Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1213 (2010); Mitchell A. Kane, Decoupling?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 235 (2008); David 
M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private 
Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 254–55 (2009).  
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pling” of the charitable deduction with the non-distribution con-
straint is good policy.  This Article attempts just that.  In doing so, it 
focuses on the so-called “agency theory.”
16
  Malani and Posner argue 
that the “agency theory” fails to justify reserving tax benefits for non-
profits.
17
  Because it is focused on the donor’s choice of charitable 
provider, the traditional “agency theory” supports a legal regime that 
does not discriminate between nonprofit and for-profit charities.
18
 
This Article attempts to expand the “agency theory” for the first 
time in such a way as to explain why it is reasonable for the govern-
ment to require that tax benefits be provided only to nonprofit firms 
that provide charitable services.  Even if meeting its objectives as “ef-
ficiently” as possible is the only concern of the government, it is justi-
fied in providing tax benefits only to nonprofit providers of charity.  
In their article, Malani and Posner imagine a transaction between 
someone who provides money to support charitable activities (a do-
nor) and someone who provides the labor and expertise (an entre-
 
 16 Posner and Malani use the term “agency theory” to describe a theory advanced 
by Henry Hansmann, with respect to nonprofit organizations, in a series of works in 
the early 1980s.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE 
L.J. 835 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Role]; Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming].  
Other works also  discuss the application of the “agency theory” to nonprofit organi-
zations.  See, e.g., Brody, supra note 8; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-
profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99 (2001); Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent 
Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1 (2000); 
Geoffrey Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 227 (1999).  See generally THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986)(discussing economic analy-
sis of nonprofit organizations, including the agency theory). 
 17 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2034–41.  I use the term “agency theory,” and 
the related terms “agent” and “principal” cautiously.  The theory called “agency the-
ory” in Malani and Posner’s article is really a theory about transaction costs, not 
agency costs because the costs incurred are those between two actors who do not le-
gally enter into an agency relationship.  The gist of the argument, however, is essen-
tially the same as the reasoning that underscored Ronald Coase’s seminal work, The 
Nature of the Firm—that transaction costs are sometimes high enough to drive rational 
market participants to create relationships unlike those that would be created by par-
ticipants in classical theoretical markets (with low transaction costs).  Ronald Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 18 Hansmann’s purported justification for the tax exemption has generally been 
called the “capital access theory,” which does link the justification for tax benefits to 
the non-distribution constraint.  See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting 
Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 75 (1981) [here-
inafter Hansmann, Rationale].  Rather than address Malani and Posner’s critiques of 
the capital access theory, this Article provides an alternative justification for linking 
tax benefits to the non-distribution constraint—one that is derived directly from the 
agency theory.  See infra Part III.   
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preneur).
19
  They conclude that there may be many circumstances in 
which a donor and an entrepreneur agree that the best way for them 
to structure their transaction for the provision of charitable goods 
would be for the entrepreneur to pay herself a “for-profit” wage.
20
  
This Article explores in greater detail the concerns of these charac-
ters in the imagined transaction, and it finds that the situations in 
which it would be rational for these two characters to structure the 
provision of charitable goods in a for-profit form are likely rare.  It 
then introduces a third character—the government—who seeks to 
subsidize the charitable activities provided by the donor and entre-
preneur.  The original contribution of this Article is that the current 
law—in which tax deductions are permitted to contributors to non-
profit firms conducting charitable activities but not to firms conduct-
ing for-profit charitable activities—is a rational response of the gov-
ernment to its own role in the transaction based on its evaluation of 
its own “agency costs.”
21
 
I should be clear: this Article is not a criticism of Google’s choice 
to pursue its social agenda through a for-profit subsidiary.  It is not a 
critique of recent “hybrid” legislation, such as benefit corporations or 
low-profit limited liability companies.  There is nothing in this Article 
that questions whether for-profit entities should seek to advance the 
social good (they should), or whether the law should be made to ac-
commodate these businesses (it should).  Nor is there any critique of 
nonprofit charities seeking to expand their funding base to include 
revenue-generating businesses or to derive revenue from pursuing 
their social mission.  The only question raised in this Article is wheth-
er the government is justified in providing tax benefits, specifically 
the deductibility of charitable contributions, only to nonprofit chari-
ties—those bound by the so-called non-distribution constraint.  At the 
heart of this question is whether it is proper for the government to 
withhold tax benefits from organizations that compensate their man-
agement with a so-called “profits” interest in the firm.
22
  I argue that it 
is. 
 
 19 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027. 
 20 Id. at 2038. 
 21 Hansmann’s justification focuses on charities’ exemption from federal corporate 
income tax, while this Article focuses on the deduction provided to donors to 
501(c)(3) charities.  See Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 55–56 (explaining the 
focus on the exemption rather than the deduction).  
 22 The “non-distribution constraint” prevents nonprofit organizations from using 
a “profits interest” in two ways: (1) to compensate management for its labor and (2) 
to compensate providers of capital for their investment.  See Hansmann, Role, supra 
note 16 at 838.  This Article discusses only the first restriction while leaving for an-
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This Article is divided into three parts.  Part II introduces the 
“agency theory” and critiques Malani and Posner’s discussion of it.  It 
finds that the agency theory predicts that donors and entrepreneurs 
will generally choose to structure their transactions through a non-
profit firm when the quality of the services they are seeking (the out-
put of the transaction) is hard to measure or hard for the donor to 
observe.  Malani and Posner propose that a “for-profit” compensation 
model may be preferable to the parties under certain circumstances,
23
 
but their analysis depends on their choice of a hypothetical in which 
the “for-profit” model actually replicates the benefits of the non-
distribution constraint.  Once the hypothetical is more fully explored, 
it becomes clear that donors who chose not to avail themselves either 
of the nonprofit form or some contractual substitute that replicates 
the effects of the non-distribution constraint would likely be creating 
a deeply inefficient transaction.  This Part of the Article corrects 
Malani and Posner’s discussion of the agency theory but does not ex-
plain why tax benefits should be legally “coupled” with the non-
distribution constraint; it does not explain why donors to charitable 
for-profit firms should be denied a tax deduction. 
Part III introduces the third character to the “agency-cost” analy-
sis: the government.  Because the government is providing a subsidy 
to the organization that provides “charitable” services, it is not only a 
regulator of providers of charity but also a market participant.  
Therefore, it has its own agency costs that are implicated in the trans-
action.  This agency-cost analysis of the government’s interest in 
providing tax subsidies appears to be novel in the literature.  Prior 
work, including Malani and Posner’s, has assumed that the govern-
ment’s interest is in facilitating the donor’s and entrepreneur’s inter-
ests in the transaction.
24
  To the contrary, I argue that the govern-
ment has its own interest: the provision of charitable goods.  While 
this interest is often closely aligned with those of donors, it may some-
times conflict with the interests of both donors and entrepreneurs.  
In this Part, I generally propose that when the government wants to 
provide services under conditions in which the quality of these ser-
vices is hard to measure or hard to observe, it acts reasonably when it 
provides tax subsidies only for those providers who are subject to the 
non-distribution constraint.  Furthermore, the government is rational 
when it chooses to provide tax benefits only to organizations that 
 
other day a full discussion of whether the prohibition a “profits” interest for investors 
is similarly justified by the “agency theory.” 
 23 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2035–37. 
 24 See, e.g., id. at 2033–34. 
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agree to abide by a standardized set of rules relating to the non-
distribution constraint.  Since it is the government that has to moni-
tor and enforce the constraint, it is obvious why it needs standardized 
rules rather than a plenitude of individually contracted agreements. 
The final Part of the Article explores current law.  Malani and 
Posner appear to be misinformed about what types of compensation 
are permitted under the law of nonprofit organizations.  They cate-
gorize the possibilities as (i) a “profits” interest—not permitted to 
nonprofit organizations, and (ii) “fixed” compensation—required for 
nonprofit organizations.
25
  In fact, there is a third option, (iii) “incen-
tive-based” compensation.  The current law of incentive-based com-
pensation mostly permits nonprofits to solve, as best as possible, the 
concerns Malani and Posner have raised about the restricting effect 
of the non-distribution constraint on the compensation of charity en-
trepreneurs.  Specifically, under current law, incentive-based com-
pensation is permitted if some method of quantifying a particular 
output—other than “net profits”—is possible.  The agency theory, as 
formulated in this Article, explains why current law draws the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible compensation arrangements in 
the proper place permitting certain incentive-pay arrangements be-
cause they are potentially efficient and prohibiting a pure profits-
based arrangement because it is inefficient.  The agency theory also 
suggests how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and legal reformers 
should be guided in further development of the law of charity man-
agement compensation. 
 
II.  THE AGENCY THEORY 
Malani and Posner’s central argument is that a for-profit organi-
zation generally operates more efficiently than a nonprofit organiza-
tion.
26
  The proposed reason that it operates more efficiently is that 
the opportunity to obtain profits incentivizes the people in control of 
the organization to increase their profits by providing whatever goods 
they provide more cheaply.
27
  To the degree to which those in control 
of an organization can cut costs while still providing sufficiently high-
quality goods, such cost-cutting increases the efficient production of 
those goods.
28
  These efficiency gains can be split between the organi-
 
 25 Id. at 2018–19.  
 26 Id. at 2055. 
 27 Id. at 2027–29. 
 28 Id. 
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zation and its customers, making everyone happier.  Thus, the gen-
eral rule is that financial incentives, like the ability to keep profits, 
encourage those in control of an organization to operate it efficiently 
to everyone’s benefit. 
Malani and Posner argue that this general rule holds for chari-
table organizations just the same as for other organizations.
29
  If the 
owners of Starbucks are encouraged to provide a great cup of coffee 
in a cost-efficient manner by their ability to get rich from doing so, 
then why should the same incentives not improve the ability of an or-
ganization that seeks to improve the health of African children?  Why 
not let providers of charitable goods keep their profits just like provid-
ers of regular consumer goods? 
 The leading answer to that question for the past thirty years has 
been Henry Hansmann’s theory of “contract failure,”
30
 which Malani 
and Posner refer to generally as the “agency theory.”
31
  The agency 
theory purports to explain why prohibiting the providers of charitable 
goods from personally keeping their profits will generally result in a 
more efficient structure than permitting them to keep them.
32
  This is 
generally because it is very difficult or impossible for the people who 
pay for charitable goods to ascertain their quality, and so, the provid-
ers of such goods will be encouraged to increase their profits by re-
ducing quality.
33
  Therefore, to prevent providers of charity from in-
creasing profits by reducing quality, funders of charity generally do 
not permit providers to take a profit.
34
  In other words, the nonprofit 
form is usually the best way to assure the most efficient production of 
quality goods since it removes the incentive to decrease quality. 
Malani and Posner are not primarily interested in whether the 
nonprofit form will usually result in a more efficient production of 
charitable goods.  Rather, they argue that the people who pay for 
such charitable goods should be allowed to decide whether a for-
profit or nonprofit structure would be best without interference from 
the government.
35
  If there could ever be a situation in which the for-
profit provider could provide charitable goods more efficiently, then 
it should not be prohibited from doing so.  The fact that the govern-
ment only provides tax benefits to nonprofit organizations that pro-
 
 29 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2063. 
 30 Id. at 2035 n.33. 
 31 Id. at 2031. 
 32 Id. at 2031–33. 
 33 See id. at 2033–34. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2037. 
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vide charitable benefits puts the government’s thumb on the scale 
and, in effect, discriminates against for-profit providers, even if those 
providers might sometimes provide charitable goods more efficiently. 
Part III of this Article addresses why the government is justified 
in reserving tax benefits for nonprofit charitable providers only.  It 
does so by expanding the agency theory to include the concerns of 
the government.  But before the theory can be so expanded, it must 
be presented.  This Part presents the agency theory as applied to the 
two primary participants in a transaction for charitable goods—the 
donor (who provides the money for the charitable goods) and the 
entrepreneur (who provides the labor and expertise for the produc-
tion of those same goods). 
A. Henry Hansmann’s Theory of “Contract Failure” 
1. Introduction to Hansmann’s Theory 
The term “agency theory,” as used by Malani and Posner, refers 
to an explanation for the existence of the nonprofit form of organiza-
tion generally associated with the work of Henry Hansmann from the 
early 1980s.
36
  Hansmann argued that under certain circumstances, 
which he called “contract failure,” purchasers of certain services 
would prefer to purchase those services from suppliers who agreed 
upfront to pay themselves only a reasonable wage and to devote any 
surplus value in the firm to advancing the mission of the firm.
37
  
Hansmann called this promise the “non-distribution constraint,” and 
he considered it the defining characteristic of a nonprofit firm.
38
  
Hansmann called the purchasers of services in this context “pa-
trons.”
39
 
Hansmann identified three situations in which “contract failure” 
was likely to occur, resulting in the creation of nonprofit firms.
40
  
First, nonprofits arise when patrons purchase services to be used by 
 
 36 See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 843–45.  Of course, there is also a histori-
cal explanation for the development of nonprofit law.  But I do not see historical ex-
planations and functional ones as inherently at odds since each may simply explain 
the same phenomenon from a different perspective.  The functional explanation 
serves as a more principled guide when considering proposed changes to existing 
policy. 
 37 See id.  
 38 See id. at 838. 
 39 See id. at 841. 
 40 Although Hansmann’s theory is developed primarily in The Role of Nonprofit En-
terprise, it is also discussed in other works.  For an especially concise description of the 
three situations in which nonprofit firms are likely to arise, see Henry Hansmann, 
Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 301–02 (1988).  
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unknown third parties.
41
  His prime example of this type of transac-
tion was CARE, an organization that solicits donations and uses the 
funds to provide relief to poor people in poor nations.
42
  Hansmann 
called the providers of third-party services “donative” because the pa-
tron’s payments are made voluntarily without any expectation of ma-
terial quid pro quo, that is, in the form of a “donation” or “contribu-
tion.”
43
 
Second, “contract failure” may arise when patrons purchase so-
called “public goods”— goods that exhibit the characteristics of being 
“nonrivalrous” and “nonexcludible.”
44
  A good is “nonrivalrous” when 
“it costs no more to provide the good to many persons than it does to 
provide it to one person.”
45
  It is “nonexcludible” if “once the good 
has been provided to one person[, then] there is no way to prevent 
others from consuming it as well.”
46
  Hansmann’s example of this type 
of organization is listener-supported (or public) radio, because (i) it 
costs the same to broadcast over public airwaves to a single user or to 
multiple users, and (ii) it is impossible to restrict access to the trans-
mission once it has been broadcast, so anyone who owns a radio can 
“free-ride” by listening to the shows without paying.
47
  Nonprofits that 
 
 41 See Hansmann, Role, supra, note 16, at 846–48. 
 42 According to its website, CARE is one of the largest private international hu-
manitarian organizations in the world, providing relief to the poorest communities.  
About Care, CARE, http://www.care.org/about/index.asp (last visited May 25, 2012).  
CARE provides relief in emergencies, but also attempts to build capacity in poor 
communities to fight poverty.  See id.  Hansmann describes CARE and similar organi-
zations as primarily providing “relief to the poor and distressed.”  Hansmann, Reform-
ing, supra note 16, at 505.  For example, he describes CARE as providing “dried milk 
for hungry children in Africa.”  Id.   
 43 See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 840. 
 44 See id. at 848. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  
 47 See id. at 849–51.  Of course, Hansmann concedes that, while radio stations fit 
the definition of public goods with respect to their listeners, access to their listeners 
is potentially a private good.  See id. at 850.  Commercial radio and television operate 
by selling access to its listeners or viewers to advertisers, for whom this access is sub-
ject to rivalry (because each minute of additional ad time has costs) and is excludible 
(because ad time can be provided to one advertiser without another advertiser hav-
ing access to it).  In addition, it has been pointed out that technology now makes it 
relatively easy to turn access to radio or television into a private good because cable 
television is so established and satellite radio is becoming more and more wide-
spread.  See, e.g., Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 1393, 1444 (1988).  Thus, in point of fact, public radio is a distinctly prob-
lematic example of a public good, although a case may be made that public radio is 
different from commercial radio in ways that make its support by advertisers or by 
cable or satellite providers sub-optimal.   
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provide public goods are also “donative” because the inability to pre-
vent free riding again means that provision of the good cannot be 
conditioned on payment.
48
 
Finally, contract failure may arise when patrons purchase certain 
services for their own use, if the quality of those services is especially 
difficult to evaluate.
49
  Hansmann’s examples of this type of nonprofit 
include organizations that provide healthcare, daycare, or nursing-
home services.
50
  He called these nonprofits “commercial” because 
their patrons paid for services in a transaction in which a specific 
good or service was provided in exchange for a set price.
51
  
Hansmann was interested in all three types of contract failure be-
cause he wanted to explain why nonprofits arise, and therefore, his 
theory needed to encompass as many types of nonprofits as possible.
52
 
In this Article, however, I am most interested in the first and se-
cond type of contract failure: the ones that produce donative nonprof-
its.  The reason for limiting my discussion is simple: the type of con-
tract failure that occurs in a donative context is different in kind from 
the type of contract failure that occurs in a commercial context, and 
the distinctive nature of the donative context demands separate anal-
ysis.  Because of this limitation, my thesis has to be similarly nar-
rowed.  I initially described my thesis as arguing that the government 
is justified in reserving tax benefits for nonprofit firms.  However, this 
Article actually only addresses one of the two major tax benefits pro-
vided by the federal government—the deduction for contributions to 
charities. 
In general, the federal government provides two major general 
tax benefits to nonprofits: the exemption from corporate tax
53
 and 
the deduction from income tax for contributions to certain charita-
ble nonprofits.
54
  The exemption means that nonprofit organizations 
that qualify may earn revenue from their operations (fees for ser-
vices) that escape taxation even when such revenue exceeds expendi-
 
 48 Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 849 (“Thus, economists generally have con-
cluded that the private market is an inefficient means of providing public goods, and 
have looked to alternatives such as public financing as a better approach.”). 
 49 Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 506. 
 50 See id. at 505–06. 
 51 See id. at 502. 
 52 See id. at 504. 
 53 See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2006). 
 54 See id. § 170.  Contributions to these same organizations may be deducted from 
the amount subject to federal estate tax and federal gift tax.  See id. §§ 2055(a)(2), 
2522(a)(2). 
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tures made to earn that revenue in the year at issue.
55
  In addition, 
they may earn a return on their investments that escapes taxation.  If 
the nonprofit had not been exempt from the corporate tax, then it 
would presumably pay tax on its net income, when such income is 
positive.
56
 
The deduction, on the other hand, applies only to donations to 
nonprofit charities.
57
  Here, the donor gets to reduce his taxable in-
come by the amount of his contribution, subject to certain re-
strictions, and therefore no benefit is provided unless a donation is 
made.
58
  Most observers consider the deduction a subsidy to the or-
ganization because the cost to the donor of making a donation is re-
duced.
59
  The federal government provides other more targeted tax 
benefits to nonprofits, like favorable postal rates and the ability to is-
sue tax-exempt bonds.
60
  And of course, states often provide tax bene-
fits that piggyback on federal classification of a nonprofit.
61
  This Arti-
cle confines itself to providing a justification for the federal income-
tax deduction and ignores all these other tax benefits, and thus, in tax 
parlance, this Article only concerns entities classified under § 
501(c)(3) of the Code—the classification that comprises most organ-
izations that are entitled to receive deductible contributions.
62
 
In some ways, the limitation of the justification to the deduction 
of contributions makes the task easier.  As Hansmann has pointed 
out, “In the case of services . . . commonly provided by donative non-
profits, the need for a [nonprofit] organization is so obvious that for-
 
 55 See id. § 501. 
 56 For a discussion of why the exemption from income sometimes constitutes a 
subsidy and sometimes does not, see Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX. L. REV. 283 (2011).  To the degree to which Hansmann’s 
work deals with tax subsidies, it has focused on the exemption.  See Hansmann, Ra-
tionale, supra note 18, at 55. 
 57 See § 170.   
 58 See id. 
 59 See Gergen, supra note 47, at 1403; see also Galle, supra note 15, at 1215; Ilan 
Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1057 
(2009).  
 60 See 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006) (favorable postal rates); 26 U.S.C. § 145 (2006) 
(tax exempt bonds). 
 61 For a discussion of state tax benefits, see Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property 
Tax-Exempt, but Some Charities Are More Exempt than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621 
(2010).  
 62 The deduction is actually provided under § 170 of the Code, but the entity 
classification is provided under § 501(c)(3), and so I refer to such organizations as 
“501(c)(3) organizations” herein.   
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profit firms are virtually unheard of.”
63
  But thinkers like Malani and 
Posner have raised the issue of whether the charitable deduction 
should be extended to donations to for-profit firms, and it therefore 
deserves its own treatment.
64
 
Hansmann argued that donative nonprofits arise because “either 
the nature of the service in question, or the circumstances under 
which it is provided, render ordinary contractual devices inadequate 
to provide the purchaser of the service with sufficient assurance that 
the service was in fact performed as desired.”
65
  That is, “Because the 
patron has no contact with the intended recipients, he or she would 
have no simple way of knowing whether the promised service was ever 
performed, much less performed well.”
66
  Because of this “contract 
failure,” the patron wants to avoid the for-profit business form.
67
  If 
the providers of the service could keep any profits not spent on 
providing the service, then “the owners of the firm would have both 
the incentive and the opportunity to provide inadequate service and 
to divert the money thus saved to themselves.”
68
  Thus, in situations of 
“contract failure,” “the nonprofit form offers [patrons] the protec-
tion of another, broader ‘contract’—namely, the organization’s 
commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to devote all of its [net] 
income [after reasonable operating expenditures such as for com-
pensation for its employees]—to the services it was formed to pro-
vide.”
69
 
 
 63 See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 508; see also Hansmann, Rationale, 
supra note 18, at 87 (“Donative nonprofits, almost by definition, typically provide ser-
vices that are delivered to third parties or are public goods, and that as a conse-
quence are attended by severe contract failure.”).  Anecdotes of contributions made 
to for-profit entities, however, are often recounted.  For example, my wife and I re-
cently made a contribution to our children’s Montessori preschool, which is a for-
profit sole proprietorship, as far as I know.      
 64 As discussed supra note 11, Malani and Posner actually argue that purchasers 
of consumer goods from for-profit firms that “refrain[] from profitable activities that 
offend moral sensibilities” should be allowed a charitable deduction for the cost of 
the consumer goods they purchased “to the extent of [the firms’] charitable activi-
ties.”  Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2062–63.  This argument is made much more 
forcefully by Henderson and Malani, who argue that the deductible amount should 
be that amount by which the cost of goods with a charitable component exceeds the 
cost of goods without a charitable component.  Henderson & Malani, supra note 8, at 
609–11.  This proposal involves valuation issues beyond the scope of this Article.   
 65 Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 504. 
 66 Id. at 505.  
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at 505.   
 69 Id. at 507.  Hansmann’s theory is nicely summed up by Susan Rose Ackerman: 
“If the quality of output is difficult to measure, and if contracts for future delivery are 
difficult to enforce, the nonprofit form may act as a signal assuring people that quali-
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Of course, there is a cost to patrons for choosing the nonprofit 
form.
70
  Namely, “The curtailment of the profit motive that results 
from the non-distribution constraint can reduce incentives for cost 
efficiency . . . .”
71
  Thus, there is a balancing of costs: on the one hand 
the cost of removing the strong incentives provided by the profit mo-
tive; on the other hand, the cost of monitoring and enforcing high-
quality services, or (in the absence of monitoring) the risk that man-
agers will reduce the quality of services in favor of profits.  Hansmann 
suggests that “[o]nly when contract failure is relatively severe is it like-
ly that the advantages of nonprofits as fiduciaries will clearly outweigh 
these corresponding disadvantages, and thus give the nonprofit firm 
a net advantage over its for-profit counterpart.”
72
 
To the degree to which it makes sense to describe Hansmann’s 
contract failure theory as a “formula,” the formula could be ex-
pressed as follows: the nonprofit form will be chosen whenever the cost of 
monitoring and enforcing a specific level of product quality exceeds the gains 
that are expected to accrue from providing the management of the charity with 
strong incentives to implement cost-saving efficiencies.
73
  The agency theory 
suggests that patrons calculate these competing costs and rationally 
choose the non-distribution constraint in at least some situations in 
which the costs of monitoring quality are high. 
2. Contract Failure and Agency Costs 
Hansmann’s basic insight is that there are situations in which the 
costs associated with acquiring goods in a normal market—the costs 
of monitoring and enforcing a quality product—are so great that the 
market will not produce the desired services, even if they are in great 
demand.
74
  Malani and Posner call Hansmann’s theory the “agency 
theory” because these monitoring and enforcement costs are plausi-
 
ty will not be sacrificed for private monetary gain.”  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduc-
tion, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE & POLICY, 
supra note 16, at  3, 5. 
 70 For acknowledgement of the loss of efficiency-enhancing incentives, see Rob 
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 518–19 (1990) 
(“Hansmann’s theory . . . assumes arguendo that nonprofit management will over-
come the temptations of waste, or worse, at least to the extent that losses from waste 
attributable to lack of scrutiny by equity owners do not exceed gains from the re-
duced incentives to increase distributable income by skimming.”).   
 71 Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 507. 
 72 Id. 
 73 This “formula” does nothing more than summarize Hansmann’s theory that 
the nonprofit form is the most efficient form when contract failure makes transac-
tion or agency costs excessively high. 
 74 See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 845 (defining “contract failure”). 
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bly called “agency costs.”
75
  The literature on agency costs generally 
proposes that whenever one person engages another to perform ser-
vices on his behalf the parties will incur some “positive monitoring 
and bonding costs (nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addi-
tion there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and 
those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.”
76
 
Generally, it is understood that no compensation structure could 
perfectly align the interests of the agent and principal and so some 
agency costs will always be incurred in an agency relationship.
77
  But 
what makes one compensation arrangement more efficient than an-
other in any specific situation is how it reduces agency costs specific 
to that situation. 
Nonprofit organizations have been intriguing to “agency-cost” 
thinkers because they pose a notoriously intractable “agency cost” 
problem.  While “owners” are presumed to make efficient decisions 
about how much to expend to monitor their agents in for-profit 
firms, nonprofit firms have no owners, and therefore, there is no one 
 
 75 It would actually be more accurate to call them “transaction costs” since the 
costs described are those associated with ensuring that a quality product is provided 
in what may well be a one-off transaction in the marketplace.  See supra note 18.  
“Agency costs” are more accurately associated with the costs incurred within a firm 
when the owners of the residual value in the firm (the principals) employee non-
owner workers (the agents) to diligently increase that residual value.  See, e.g., Louis 
Putterman, Ownership and the Nature of the Firm, 17 J. COMP. ECON. 243, 244 (1993) 
(“The . . . separation of ownership and work is the basic cause of the familiar agency 
problem between employer and employee.”).  Hansmann does not use either term.  
In this Article, I have chosen to use the term “agency costs” because it is used to de-
scribe the costs involved (monitoring, etc.) consistently in the literature.  See, e.g., 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 635 
(2004) (“The agency cost theories of the firm focus on the problems of shirking and 
monitoring that stem from information asymmetries within the organization’s com-
ponent relationships.”).  The type of market transaction engaged in between a donor 
and an entrepreneur in Malani and Posner’s article could plausibly meet the defini-
tion of an “agency relationship,” giving rise to agency costs, at least under a defini-
tion provided by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in a seminal article on the 
subject: “We define agency relationship as a contract under which one or more per-
sons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent.”  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 76 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 75, at 308.  According to Jensen and Meckling, 
“monitoring” costs are those incurred by the principal to ensure that his interests are 
maximized, and “bonding” costs are those incurred by the agent to assure the prin-
cipal that the agent is maximizing the principal’s interests.  See id. at 308–09.  Agency 
costs also include the residual loss incurred by the divergence of interests that is not 
corrected by expenditures for monitoring or bonding.  Id.  
 77 Sitkoff, supra note 75, at 637. 
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who can gain financially from ensuring that agents act efficiently.
78
  
From a legal point of view, a board of directors is ultimately responsi-
ble for the actions of the organization, but this board of directors it-
self has no right to residual value in the firm, and no one with such 
an interest can discipline the board for failing to maximize benefits.
79
  
Nor can the board be disciplined by a market for corporate control 
since the right to elect board members is either held by the board it-
self or by “members” whose control rights cannot be sold.  This lack 
of strong incentives among private parties coupled with restrictive 
standing rules is perceived as a perfect storm that creates outrageous 
inefficiency in nonprofit firms.
80
 
While there are no true “principals” in the nonprofit organiza-
tion from a legal point of view, the non-distribution constraint creates 
a sort of theoretical agency relationship between the managers (as 
agents) and the mission of the nonprofit.
81
  Because any residual val-
ue in the firm is committed to the mission of the organization, the 
managers are in effect working for the ultimate benefit of the mission 
since they have fiduciary duties to faithfully pursue the mission. 
But, of course, the “mission” of the charity is often somewhat dif-
fuse and undefined, and there is no existing person who can enforce 
the management’s fidelity to its best interest—at least no one with a 
financial interest in doing so.  Even the charitable beneficiaries, who 
may sometimes benefit financially from the charity, are too diffuse a 
 
 78 See, e.g., Putterman, supra note 75, at 256 (“[W]hereas the existence of a resid-
ual claimant and holder of alienation rights is regarded as the best guarantor of effi-
cient resource use where conventional goods are concerned, it is the absence of such 
[a person] that is called for [in the nonprofit setting].”).   
 79 The board can be held legally accountable but not by anyone with a right to 
the residual value in the firm.  For example, the state attorney general is authorized 
to sue in all states.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959) (“[A] 
suit to enforce a charitable trust can be maintained by the Attorney General of the 
State in which the charitable trust is to be administered.”)  In some states, donors 
may sue under certain circumstances, as can others with “special interests” in the or-
ganization.  See Jonathan Klick & Robert Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and 
Corporate Control: Evidence from the Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 818–19 
(2008) (“Almost half the states have given Donors standing concurrent with the at-
torney general to enforce a charitable trust.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 79, at 782 (“The prevailing scholarly view, in 
other words, is that agency costs are rampant in charitable trust governance.”) (citing 
Richard Posner, Marion Fremont-Smith, Henry Hansmann, Harvey Dale, Evelyn 
Brody, Alex Johnson, Dana Brakman Reiser, Ronald Chester, and Susan Gary).  
 81 Id. at 780 (“[A] charitable trust must be for the benefit of a charitable purpose 
. . . not for a specific beneficiary. . . .  Hence, for a charitable trust there is no identi-
fiable beneficiary with an economic incentive and legal standing to ensure [that the 
charity efficiently pursue its purpose.]”). 
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class to adequately enforce the obligations of the charity’s manage-
ment, even if they were legally permitted to do so. 
If the beneficiaries cannot fulfill a monitoring role, then the do-
nors could potentially play the role of “principals” in the agency rela-
tionship.  To the degree to which they have donated money to the 
organization for the purpose of advancing the organization’s charita-
ble mission, it is in their interest to make sure that money is spent 
well.  The problem is that it is not always entirely clear that the do-
nors’ sole interest is in advancing the organization’s charitable mis-
sion.  Any divergence of the donors’ interests from those of the chari-
table mission of the organization means that the donor will not be a 
perfect guardian of the true principal’s interest. 
Even though the donor is not really the true “principal” in the 
nonprofit charitable form, in Hansmann’s theory it is the donor who 
must make a decision about how to provide charitable goods, and so 
it is the donor who must perform some sort of “agency cost” analysis 
to determine whether he would be better served trying to provide 
those charitable goods through a nonprofit or a for-profit firm.
82
  
Hansmann’s theory posits that when donative charities provide chari-
table goods, it is likely that the “agency costs” involved in monitoring 
quality, in bonding, and in losses involved in inadequately monitor-
ing or bonding in a for-profit firm are likely to persuade donors to 
make their donations to nonprofit providers. 
3. Donors and the Market for “Altruism” 
The insight described above—that donors are not the true 
“principals” in a charitable transaction and yet are the ones who 
choose which organizations get support—is extremely important.  
The idea that socially beneficial goods can be provided through pri-
vate charities depends on donors having at least some interest in so-
cially beneficial outcomes.  If the government seeks to subsidize the 
provision of socially beneficial outcomes—charity—then it must be 
able to determine when and to what extent it can rely on the choices 
 
 82 While I treat the donor as the sole “principal” in Part II of this Article, the cen-
tral thesis described in Part III is that the donor is not the only principal.  When the 
government provides tax incentives to donors to make charitable contributions, it too 
becomes a principal.  The government then must examine its own agency costs.  The 
American system of subsidizing charities through a generally applicable subsidy for 
charitable donations gains much of its strength from the incorporation of this cen-
tral agency-cost insight: the government can save agency costs in providing charitable 
goods if it can identify donors whose interests broadly align with its own.  Thus, iden-
tifying those donors is the central concern of the law governing the charitable tax 
deduction. 
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of donors.  That is, the government needs to be able to determine 
when donors’ interest is in providing charitable goods and when they 
have other interests that the government may not share.  If that is 
true, then some explanation is needed of what donors are doing 
when they donate money to charities.
83
 
Hansmann called the people who provided the money to fund 
nonprofit organizations, the “patrons.”
84
  Patrons are both regular 
customers who purchase a good, like medical care, for their own con-
sumption, and “donors,” who purchase a good for the benefit of 
some unknown third party.
85
  But since this Article focuses on dona-
tive nonprofits, only donors are of interest.  Donors are in some ways 
like customers who trade their money for something they want.  All 
other things being equal, they try to get services of a certain quality at 
the cheapest price they can.  In other words, they try to maximize 
their own utility in the transaction. 
The donor who provides charitable goods to benefit a third par-
ty is both similar and different.  Hansmann’s example of a provider of 
third-party services is CARE, an organization that provides relief food 
or medical care for poor people in developing countries, especially 
Africa.
86
  When a person contributes money to CARE, he is doing so 
for the purpose of helping someone else.
87
  He wants to help that per-
son.  He wants to do good for someone other than himself.  In this 
Article, I will call this act “altruistic.”
88
 
 
 83 See, e.g., Henderson and Malani, supra note 8, at 577–78. 
 84 See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 502–03.  One could imagine other 
potential types of suppliers of money to an organization.  For example, organizations 
often receive money from people who are not “patrons” in either the donative or the 
commercial sense.  This money is not payment for services; rather it is capital to be 
used to build up or expand the business, with the assumption that earnings (from 
payments from patrons) will follow in sufficient amounts to justify the expenditure of 
the capital.  These providers of money should probably be called “investors.”  A sus-
tained treatment of investors is beyond the scope of this work. 
 85 Id.  There is also arguably a subclass of donors who purchase so-called “public” 
goods both for their own consumption and for the consumption of the general pub-
lic.  For example, a donor to listener-supported radio contributes in order to enjoy 
programming that he likes but also to permit others to enjoy the same programming.  
He either values the fact that others are “free-riding” on his donation or he is indif-
ferent to it.  
 86 Id. at 505. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Of course, pure altruism may not be the only reason why a person donates to a 
donative charity.  He may receive some sort of immaterial gain from the transaction.  
For example, he may gain the trust or respect of his peers by donating.  This trust or 
respect may be a good in itself, or it may be useful to the donor in the future in some 
transaction with his peers that may result in material gain to him.  Even if he donates 
anonymously, it is possible to describe the donor’s motivation as a form of benefit to 
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 While it is slightly awkward to do so, I will use the word “altru-
ism” as a good or service sought by donors to a charitable endeavor.
89
  
Thus, when a donor contributes money to a charitable enterprise 
with no expectation that he will get it back, and no expectation that 
he will receive anything of material value in return for it, I will say 
that he has purchased some altruism.  Thus, in Hansmann’s example 
of the African relief organization CARE, the money provided by do-
nors can be explained only if we assume that these donors want to 
advance the health of African children—that is, they want some altru-
ism—and they are willing to pay for it.  So, donors are similar to “cus-
tomers” (the other subcategory of patrons) in that they are purchas-
ing something (in this case “altruism”) for themselves.  But it is 
important to distinguish them from other customers because the na-
ture of the good they are buying—altruism—is different from the na-
ture of what is being bought by other customers.
90
 
The reason I care about distinguishing “altruistic” motives from 
non-altruistic motives is not because I argue that altruism itself de-
serves to be rewarded with government largess.  Rather, the point is 
that when a donor provides altruism to himself, he provides some-
thing that benefits the general public.  Therefore, the government’s 
ability to identify the donor seeking altruism may be the key to the 
government’s ability to provide tax benefits in an efficient manner.  
Tax benefits to donors seeking altruism advance the government’s in-
 
himself.  He donates because it makes him feel good to do so.  This motivation has 
been called “warm glow.”  See Galle, supra note 15, at 1222; see also Henderson & 
Malani, supra note 8, at 583 (identifying “warm glow” motivations, distinguishing 
them from “pure altruism,” and stating that they use the term “altruism” to describe 
a mixture of warm glow and pure altruism).  These possible immaterial benefits, 
therefore, range on a spectrum from those benefits that are closest to a financial 
benefit to those motives that are practically indistinguishable from the genuine de-
sire to assist others.  For example, it is hard to discern a precise difference between 
donating to the entrepreneur’s efforts to help African children because it makes the 
donor feel good and donating out of a genuinely non-self-interested desire to help.  
Luckily, for the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to distinguish between 
genuine other-directedness and a desire to help someone because it makes one feel 
good; it is enough to call both of those things “altruism.”  Accepting that “altruism” is 
a tricky and controversial concept, I am satisfied with the definition of “weak altru-
ism” provided by Rob Atkinson: “The point to be made here is that, despite unclarity 
at the margin, the central concept of weak altruism—a transfer without a quid pro 
quo—is not only intelligible, but also operable, as a criterion for drawing distinctions 
with important legal consequences.”  Atkinson, supra note 70, at 531–32.   
 89 In this usage, I follow Henderson & Malani, supra note 8, at 573 (“With total 
charitable activity . . . totaling nearly one trillion dollars in the United States last year, 
the demand for altruism is obvious.”). 
 90 As Rob Atkinson has pointed out, this situation is unusual, and it is worth em-
phasizing “the distinctiveness of transactions in which one party confers a benefit on 
another without the expectation of material reward.”  Atkinson, supra note 70, at 523. 
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terest in providing public and third-party goods.  Tax benefits to do-
nors seeking non-altruistic goods do not advance the government’s 
interests. 
B. Malani and Posner’s Application of the Agency Theory 
Malani and Posner argue that the charitable deduction should 
be provided to donors to any firm that provides charitable goods, 
whether the firm is a nonprofit or a for-profit.
91
  The agency theory 
provides an explanation for why purchasers of altruism would, in 
most cases, prefer to purchase their altruism from nonprofit firms. 
Malani and Posner begin their article with a hypothetical, which 
they use to illustrate why a donor and an entrepreneur might choose 
to structure their donative transaction in a for-profit form.
92
  When ex-
amined more closely, however, their hypothetical actually illustrates 
quite well why—consistent with Hansmann’s prediction—a donor 
would almost always choose a nonprofit rather than a for-profit struc-
ture for his charitable contribution.  The donor would choose a non-
profit to provide altruistic goods because the cost of monitoring the 
“product quality” of altruistic goods will almost always exceed the 
gains that he may predict could be caused by the incentives provided 
by the for-profit form.  Malani and Posner’s hypothetical illustrates 
this cost-benefit analysis because they craft a sort of private non-
distribution constraint to cabin the costs of monitoring product qual-
ity, thus illustrating the necessity of a non-distribution constraint to 
ensure product quality in most donative charities.  The best way to 
evaluate this argument is by investigating Malani and Posner’s hypo-
thetical in some detail. 
1. The Non-Distribution Constraint’s Effect on the 
Entrepreneur’s Compensation 
Malani and Posner ask us to imagine that an entrepreneur 
“wants to establish a charity to improve the health of children in de-
veloping countries.” 
93
  She will do so by devising ways to provide 
clean water to previously underserved remote villages in Africa.
94
  
Thus, Malani and Posner’s hypothetical is a classic donative-type char-
 
 91 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2022. 
 92 Id. at 2018. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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ity and is very similar to Hansmann’s example of a donative organiza-
tion, CARE, which provides food to hungry children.
95
 
The donor in Malani and Posner’s hypothetical generally con-
forms to the image of a donor discussed above.
96
  It is unclear exactly 
why the donor does what he does, but it is certain that he wants to 
provide money and in return obtain some benefit for African chil-
dren.  He wants to purchase some altruism.
97
  But Malani and Posner 
are actually more interested in the entrepreneur than the donor in 
the transaction. 
In Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the entrepreneur thinks 
that her activities potentially create altruism.
98
  She does not want to 
provide her own money in exchange for that altruism, though. 
99
  She 
thinks that other people may want to help African children and that 
they may be willing to provide cash in exchange for it.
100
  She wants to 
provide her labor (her organizational, managerial, or innovative 
skills) to improve children’s health, and she wants to receive at least 
some money in exchange for it.
101
  Thus, she makes a deal with the 
donors: if they give her some cash, she will improve the health of Af-
 
 95 Compare Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018, with Hansmann, Reforming, su-
pra note 16, at 505. 
 96 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 97 Among other things, we know that the donor is not an “investor,” as that term 
is described supra note 82.  The non-distribution constraint prevents the donor from 
receiving any financial return on his contribution.  I will assume for the present that 
the donor is not the same person as the entrepreneur, even though there is nothing 
in current law to prevent the donor from being paid for his labor by the charity, nor 
is there anything to prevent the entrepreneur from donating to her own charity.  
 98 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2032.   
 99 Id. at 2018 (“Running this charity will require the entrepreneur’s time and ef-
fort, for which she would like to be compensated out of the funds that the organiza-
tions obtains from donations or revenues from any sales made in developed coun-
tries.”) 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 2018–19.  The question of whether the entrepreneur is also seeking some 
“altruism” for herself is one that is central to many treatments of this issue.  In other 
words, it is possible that the entrepreneur will seek less financial compensation for 
providing children’s health because she values doing it for its own sake.  To the de-
gree to which donors can perceive the fact that the entrepreneur wants to advance 
the same altruistic goals as they do, donors would be very wise to invest their money 
with the entrepreneur, since their unanimity of interests has the potential to com-
pletely eliminate agency costs, which, after all, arise from the disparate interests of 
agents and principals.  Some commentators have emphasized the entrepreneurs’ ac-
ceptance of low salaries as a signal of their altruism.  See, e.g., Galle, supra note 15, at 
1225; Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the ‘Contract Failure’ Explanation for Non-Profit Organiza-
tions and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1997).  The prob-
lem, of course, is that acceptance of low salary may be a sign not only of the “altru-
ism” of the entrepreneur but also of her incompetence.  
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rican children.
102
  This is a simple transaction between a provider of 
labor (the entrepreneur) and some providers of funds (the donors).  
This Article assumes that the entrepreneur wants to maximize her fi-
nancial compensation—she is not seeking any altruism for herself.
103
 
Malani and Posner argue that the entrepreneur has the choice 
between two basic forms of compensation for her efforts on behalf of 
the African children.  On the one hand, she can provide herself with 
a “fixed” salary, in which case she can create a “nonprofit” firm and 
employ herself as its director.
104
  If she would prefer, however, she can 
pay herself with whatever funds are left over after she provides health 
to the African children—the “profits” of the firm—in which case she 
can structure her charity as a “for-profit.”
105
  Malani and Posner ask: 
Why should the existence of an income-tax deduction for contribu-
tions to nonprofit firms, but not for-profit firms, influence this simple 
arrangement between donors and the entrepreneur?  Since econom-
ic theory suggests that the for-profit model is preferable to many con-
sumers in the provision of goods for themselves, why should we as-
sume ex ante that donors would not prefer to use a for-profit 
structure in providing health to African children?
106
 
Malani and Posner briefly recount the well-accepted reasoning 
that supports consumers’ choice of for-profit firms for regular con-
sumer goods.  In order to explain the choices of compensation struc-
ture available to the donors and the entrepreneur, they ask us to im-
agine a transaction in which the donors want to provide for the 
health of African children by supplying them with fresh water.
107
  
 
 102 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018.  
 103 Malani and Posner argue that “[o]ne problem with the agency theory is that it 
assumes that only altruistic Entrepreneurs will choose the nonprofit form, and that 
nonaltruistic entrepreneurs will always choose the for-profit form.”  Id. at 2034.  As 
discussed herein, the agency theory suggests that non-altruistic entrepreneurs will 
choose the nonprofit form when the agency costs of ensuring a quality product ex-
ceeds the (predicted) loss of efficiency from removing profit as an incentive for cre-
ating efficiency.  None of the works cited by Posner and Malani support their claim 
that the “agency theory” only explains the choice of the nonprofit form when the en-
trepreneur is altruistic.  See, e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 16, at 102 () (“Our 
basic results . . . do not depend on Entrepreneurial altruism . . . .  [But] our model 
shows that more altruistic Entrepreneurs would opt for nonprofit status.”).   
 104 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018.   
 105 As discussed infra Part IV, this simple binary description of possible compensa-
tion structures does not conform to reality.  Instead, it makes more sense to envision 
an array of possible compensation structures, with “fixed” at one pole, “profits-based” 
at the other, and various types of “incentive-based” structures inhabiting the range of 
possibilities between the poles. 
 106 See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019. 
 107 Id. at 2018. 
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Through the efforts of the entrepreneur, “the charity raises $10 mil-
lion from donors but manages to develop a water filtration system at a 
cost of only $8 million.”
108
  Now imagine the two possible compensa-
tion structures described by Malani and Posner.  If the charity is a for-
profit, the entrepreneur can take home the two-million-dollar profit.  
That is her compensation.  If the charity is a nonprofit, then the en-
trepreneur would only be paid the fixed salary to which she agreed in 
advance.
109
 
There is a compelling reason why donors might want to com-
pensate the entrepreneur using a “profits” interest in the firm.  Do-
nors know that the entrepreneur is the one most likely to discover 
cost-saving mechanisms for providing water to African children.
110
  Af-
ter all, the entrepreneur is the one who is there.  She is the one who 
presumably knows the most about African children, their needs, and 
how best to provide for those needs.  If the entrepreneur acts to max-
imize her financial interests, then providing her with a financial in-
centive to reduce the costs involved in providing water to African 
children is the best way to maximize the chances that such cost-saving 
efficiencies will be discovered or implemented.
111
  Thus, there may be 
good reasons to incentivize the entrepreneur’s discovery and imple-
 
 108 Id.  Malani and Posner use ten million dollars and eight million dollars when 
they initially introduce their hypothetical, but they later change the amounts to one 
hundred dollars and eighty dollars.  Id. at 2027.   
 109 Malani and Posner suggest that the for-profit structure may be better than the 
nonprofit because, if the entrepreneur is very talented, she could make a lot of mon-
ey at a for-profit company and she may not be willing to work at the nonprofit for 
such a low salary.  Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019.  They also suggest that she 
might need to provide a “profits” interest in the firm not just to herself, but “to moti-
vate her employees to work hard.”  Id.  If high quality entrepreneurs prefer the for-
profit form, then donors might prefer it as well in order to retain talented managers 
or workers.  Malani and Posner’s assumption, however, that a nonprofit wage (a 
“fixed” salary) is necessarily a low salary is not reflected either conceptually or actually 
in the law of nonprofits.  There is nothing about the non-distribution constraint, or 
in the law of charitable nonprofits, that prevents nonprofit firms from paying an ex-
ecutive what her labor is worth.  This subject is discussed more fully infra Part IV.  At 
least theoretically, if the entrepreneur could be paid a fixed salary of two million dol-
lars at a for-profit firm doing similar work, she could be paid two million dollars to 
manage the nonprofit firm.  “Thus, nonprofit law does not compel the argument 
that the entrepreneur will abandon nonprofit firms because the pay is too low.  
 110 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027. 
 111 As Evelyn Brody has pointed out, “[W]hile the nondistribution constraint 
might convince the patron that the nonprofit is more trustworthy than a for-profit in 
situations of opportunistic behavior, the nonprofit could be even less trustworthy in 
avoiding inefficient expenditures.”  Brody, supra note 8, at 464.  Atkinson describes 
this problem with a reference to equity owners: “Without equity owners looking over 
their accounts, if not their shoulders, nonprofit managers lose an important incen-
tive to minimize costs.”  Atkinson, supra note 70, at 518. 
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mentation of cost-saving methods of providing water.
112
  The proper 
question is not how high or low the entrepreneur’s  compensation is 
but who bears the risk that the costs of providing the service promised 
will be greater than or less than those expected by the donor.
113
  It is 
obvious why donors may want the entrepreneur to bear that risk (and 
be compensated with the upside potential of being able to provide 
the agreed-upon goods at a lower-than-expected cost).
114
 
But the impediments to the donor compensating the entrepre-
neur with a profit interest in the transaction are substantial.  The 
primary impediment to the for-profit structure is the predicted cost 
the donor will incur in monitoring the quality of the altruistic goods 
provided by the entrepreneur.  Remember, with ordinary consumer 
goods, like a cup of coffee, the purchaser of the good can evaluate 
the quality immediately, simply by taking a sip.  He can choose to 
never again buy coffee from a provider who has not supplied suffi-
cient quality to justify the price.  But in the case of altruistic goods, 
the donor does not have immediate access to the information neces-
sary to evaluate the quality of the good supplied.  The goal is to pro-
vide water to African children.  How much water has been provided?  
What are comparable costs of providing water from other suppliers?  
Has the water been provided in a sustainable way?  Is providing water 
even the best way to improve the lives of children?  Is one’s contribu-
 
 112 Donors are unlikely to agree that the entrepreneur can take home all of the 
savings she provides, but one could imagine an agreement by which they split the 
profits in some way.  That is, she provides them with a slightly lower cost product and 
keeps the remainder as compensation for producing the savings that resulted in the 
lower cost to the donors. 
 113 If the entrepreneur were restricted to a fixed salary, as Malani and Posner ar-
gue she is in a nonprofit firm, then she would have to decide ex ante what the split 
would be between her salary and the administrative costs.  If she could compensate 
herself with a “profits” interest, as she can in a for-profit firm, then she could wait 
and pay herself whatever is left over after she pays all the administrative costs.  Thus, 
the difference between a “fixed” salary and a “for-profit” salary is actually one of time 
(and therefore it is an allocation of risk).  If the entrepreneur chooses a “split” of 
administrative costs ex ante, then her compensation is “fixed,” and the donor bears 
the risk that other administrative costs will be high; if she waits until actual, other 
administrative costs are incurred to determine how much of the total administrative 
cost pie she can keep for herself, then she has a “profits” interest and she bears the 
risk that other administrative costs will be high.  Economic literature on “incomplete 
contracts” suggests that when it is impossible for a contract to fully specify potential 
outcomes, the allocation of residual control rights is extremely important because it 
determines who benefits from an innovation or a changed outcome.  See, e.g., Oliver 
Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-
Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. C69 (2003).   
 114 Posner and Malani do not expressly consider the possibility that the entrepre-
neur could get paid nothing under the for-profit model, although, theoretically, this 
should be a possibility. 
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tion providing any marginal benefit, or would the benefit be the same 
without that contribution?
115
  Answering all of these questions has 
some cost, and the uncertainty that arises from being unable to an-
swer these questions can also be described as a cost.  These costs are 
the “agency costs” that give the so-called agency theory its name. 
Thus, in the case of altruistic goods, like the one described in 
Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the “agency costs” associated with 
assessing and monitoring product quality are substantial.  When 
agency costs are high, donors may prefer a nonprofit form.  Another 
way of looking at the issue is that the “agency costs” described are all 
related to assessing whether the entrepreneur is providing a quality 
good, or is, instead, enriching herself by shirking on quality.
116
  If it is 
too expensive for the donor to ensure himself that the entrepreneur 
is not enriching herself by providing low-quality services, then a non-
distribution constraint is a rational choice.
117
 
 
 115 The situation can be illustrated as follows: First, imagine a donor paying $100 
to an organization that provides $100 worth of food to African children.  Obviously, 
the donor would be happy with that outcome; there was no payment necessary for 
the administrative costs of getting the food to the children.  Second, imagine that a 
donor pays $100 to an organization, that other donors pay $10,000 to the same or-
ganization, and that  the organization provides $10,100 worth of food to African 
children.  Again, the donor got a great deal since all of the money spent provided a 
benefit to her intended beneficiaries.  Finally, imagine that a donor pays $100 to an 
organization to which other donors pay $10,000 but that the organization only pro-
vides $100 worth of food to African children (presumably, the $10,000 goes into the 
pockets of the managers of the organization).  The donor still got $100 worth of food 
for African children for her $100 donation, but the managers pocketed the money 
provided by everyone else.  If this final hypothetical organization does not provide a 
“quality good” in exchange for the donations received—if a donor would prefer to 
give her money to the first or second organization—then “altruism” is a good such 
that its marginal benefit is a material consideration for donors.  In order to separate 
the benefit attributable to the donor’s payments from the benefits attributable to 
everyone else’s donations, it is important whether one donor’s payments can be 
identified with some measurable output of benefit’. 
 116 The counterpoint of the agency costs involved in assessing product quality sug-
gests an alternative formulation of the “formula” proposed above.  See supra Part 
II.A.1.  The assessment of “agency costs” could be expressed in this way: the nonprofit 
form will be chosen whenever it is impossible or prohibitively costly for the Patron to distinguish 
profits derived from efficiently providing a high-quality product and profits derived from shirk-
ing on quality. 
 117 As Malani and Posner put it: “The nondistribution constraint blunts the incen-
tive of the Entrepreneur to shirk by limiting the return that the Entrepreneur re-
ceives from the operation of the firm.”  Malani and Posner, supra note 8, at 2033–34.   
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2. Malani and Posner’s Hypothetical Reduces Agency 
Costs by Replicating the Non-Distribution Constraint 
Malani and Posner solve the “agency cost” problem not by show-
ing how the cost of monitoring product quality could be reduced, but 
by creating a hypothetical situation in which the entrepreneur cannot 
enrich herself by shirking on quality.
118
  In other words, they create a 
private non-distribution constraint, which solves the agency cost prob-
lem in the exact same way the non-distribution constraint is intended 
to solve the agency cost problem: by committing a certain amount of 
money to be spent on charitable purposes and preventing the entre-
preneur from enriching herself by reducing that amount of money.  
Malani and Posner illustrate the difference between compensation in 
a for-profit firm and a nonprofit firm as follows: they ask us to imag-
ine that the entrepreneur promises the donors that she will use 
eighty percent of their donations directly to provide for sick children 
in Africa.
119
  They define a “high quality product” as providing eighty 
percent of every dollar donated to the children.
120
  Presumably, that 
reflects the donor’s best information about what he could obtain 
from other providers in the relevant market.  One should note that 
with respect to the eighty percent provided to children in Africa, the 
entrepreneur is not permitted to increase her compensation by 
providing services more efficiently.  She must use all eighty percent of 
the money provided for the benefit of the children, no matter how 
much it costs to provide them with water.  In other words, she is 
bound by the non-distribution constraint! 
Thus, without saying so explicitly, Malani and Posner concede 
that with respect to the eighty percent provided to the African chil-
dren, the nonprofit model is preferred.  Presumably, this non-distribution 
constraint is necessitated by the very agency costs that make the non-
distribution constraint so often the most efficient method of provid-
ing charitable goods—the cost of identifying what would constitute a 
benefit for the African children and monitoring whether an agreed-
upon benefit has been provided for each dollar donated.  But Malani 
and Posner do not seem to appreciate that the non-distribution con-
straint in this part of their organization will have the very same costs 
as elsewhere—the entrepreneur has no incentive to provide actual 
 
 118 Id. at 2027. 
 119 Malani and Posner state that the entrepreneur will “ensure [that eighty per-
cent of the money they donate] reache[d] the hands of the sick children[.]”  Id.  
They also state that she will “send [eighty percent] of the donation to sick children.”  
Id. 
 120 Id. at 2032. 
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benefit to the African children efficiently; as long as she spends 
eighty percent of the money on something in Africa, she has provided 
a quality good.
121
 
Malani and Posner then ask us to imagine that the remaining 
twenty percent has to be split between her personal compensation 
and “administrative costs.”
122
  These “administrative costs” must be 
separated from program costs, and the hypothetical only works if they 
can be reduced without harming the donor’s interests.  Malani and 
Posner suggest that the twenty percent of each donation that can be 
used for something other than the direct benefit of the children will 
be split between administrative costs and the entrepreneur’s compen-
sation.
123
  They argue that the entrepreneur is more likely to find ways 
to reduce administrative costs if she is permitted to increase her 
compensation.
124
  But the reason that this compensation structure 
appears to be so attractive depends on the nature of “administrative” 
costs.  If these costs can be reduced without any reduction in the qual-
ity of the goods provided, then there is no reason for the donor to be 
concerned with whether they are paid to third parties or kept by the 
entrepreneur.  Malani and Posner purport to define a quality product 
(eighty percent of each contribution goes to Africa) in a way that re-
ducing administrative costs cannot affect it.
125
  If there is no way for the 
 
 121 Malani and Posner appear to recognize that contract failure may require some 
form of non-distribution constraint to facilitate an efficient transaction, and thus 
they propose several methods for using an express non-distribution constraint in 
what is otherwise a formally for-profit firm.  Id. at 2036.  They propose that if the en-
trepreneur promised to hire a manager to control all expenditures of the firm and 
did not allow that manager to profit from cost-saving innovations, the donors may be 
assured that the firm would not enrich itself by shirking on quality.  Id.  It is hard to 
see why this solution is better than a traditional nonprofit, because the manager who 
controls expenditures has no strong financial incentive to improve the efficiency of 
the firm.  Second, Malani and Posner propose that “an auditor” could police the 
contract, which of course is one way to address monitoring problems, although it has 
a cost.  Id.  Finally, they suggest that the entrepreneur could institute a “cost-plus 
pricing scheme” in which the donors rather than the entrepreneur are the residual 
beneficiaries so the entrepreneur is paid a fixed salary, but the donors receive a re-
fund at the end of the year if any cost-saving mechanisms are found.  Id. at 2036–37.  
Again, it is not clear why this form is better than a nonprofit since the entrepreneur 
is still paid a fixed salary.   
 122 Id. at 2027. 
 123 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027.  
 124 Id. at 2027–28. 
 125 Id. at 2032.  In point of fact, it is plausible that administrative costs are relevant 
to whether a quality product is provided, if they include the agency costs involved in 
ensuring the quality of the product.  For example, imagine that some of the twenty 
percent spent on administrative costs help the donor monitor whether eighty per-
cent of each dollar donated is spent in Africa or not.  In that case, a donor would not 
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entrepreneur to reduce quality by decreasing administrative costs 
(i.e., all eighty percent is provided to African children), then there is 
no reason why the donor should object to the entrepreneur keeping 
any savings she creates through cutting administrative costs.  In other 
words, Malani and Posner have created a hypothetical in which agen-
cy costs incurred in monitoring product quality with respect to ad-
ministrative costs are zero.  It is no wonder, then, that a for-profit 
compensation structure would be preferable in this situation.
126
 
Thus, in Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the non-distribution 
constraint is necessary with respect to eighty percent of each dona-
tion, but a for-profit structure is more efficient for the other twenty 
percent.
127
  The ideal solution would be for the law to permit this 
split.  As discussed in Part IV, it does. 
3. What if “High Quality Product” Was Defined in a Way 
that Did Not Replicate the Non-Distribution 
Constraint? 
While Malani and Posner’s choice of a percentage of money “go-
ing to” the charitable purpose replicates the non-distribution con-
straint, one could imagine an agreement between entrepreneur and 
donor in which “high quality” is defined not by an amount of money 
but by a quantum of benefit.  This definition of “high quality” product 
could also create a situation in which agency costs may be minimized 
and the non-distribution constraint may be unnecessary or may result 
in an inefficient transaction. 
Of course, the “quantum” of benefit would have to increase with 
each additional dollar contributed.  This is necessary to ensure that 
each dollar donated provides some marginal benefit to the children.  
Presumably, it matters to the donor whether his contribution increas-
es the benefit provided, and so he has an interest in monitoring not 
 
be indifferent to cuts in administrative costs, unless they did not impact his ability to 
monitor the quality of the product provided by the entrepreneur.  
 126 See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the “formula”). 
 127 Even as described by Malani and Posner, the hypothetical may well be objec-
tionable to donors because it is only a good bargain for the donor if administrative 
costs reasonably increase in proportion to the amount of money provided for pro-
gram costs.  This is possible, but it is more likely that some administrative costs are 
fixed.  In other words, the first fixed amount of money is needed to get lights turned 
on in an office (and other related expenses) and no money can be provided to Afri-
can children until basic fixed costs are paid for.  Then, after fixed costs are covered, 
administrative costs presumably decline.  If that is true, then an entrepreneur’s gam-
ble that she can decrease administrative costs is really a bet that she can raise more 
money than is predicted and thereby enrich herself because the marginal costs of 
administration decline.   
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just the overall benefit provided by the charity but the benefit provid-
ed by his contributions.
128
  It would not be sufficient to say that money is 
being raised to provide clean water to one million African children; 
rather, the entrepreneur would have to promise to provide a certain 
quantum of water per dollar contributed. 
129
  Thus under the hypo-
thetical provided, in which the donor wishes to provide clean water to 
African children, imagine that donors are seeking to provide clean 
water to ten million African children.
130
  Providers of aid other than 
the entrepreneur are offering to build a water delivery system that 
would benefit ten million Africans for ten million dollars (of which 
$500,000 is fixed compensation for their CEO).  The entrepreneur 
believes that she can do it for eight million dollars plus her compen-
sation.  If the entrepreneur could provide the same amount of water 
for a lower price, then the for-profit model might be preferred.
131
 
This hypothetical potentially does a better job of solving the in-
centive problem associated with the non-distribution constraint than 
Malani and Posner’s hypothetical.  In this case, the entrepreneur is 
incentivized not only to cut administrative costs but also to find more 
efficient ways of providing the identified benefit, which is, after all, 
what donors want her to do.  But agency costs associated with this 
type of approach are also potentially higher.  Because a quality prod-
 
 128 This concern with the marginal benefit provided with each dollar contributed 
could be called the “non-divisibility” problem that is generally an aspect of public 
goods.  See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 506 (stating that public goods are 
likely to be provided only by nonprofits because “owing to the indivisible nature of 
the service involved, the consumer generally has no simple means of observing 
whether his or her contribution has increased the level of the service provided[, 
r]ather, the consumer must take the producer’s word that the contribution will be 
used to purchase more of the good, rather than simply going into someone’s pock-
et”). 
 129 Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, to its credit, did not completely ignore the 
divisibility problem.  Some commentators, like Dan Pallotta, argue that once enough 
money is raised to meet the charity’s goals, the entrepreneur should be able to keep 
whatever else she raised.  See DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON 
NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 15 (2008).  In that case, if the agreement 
was structured as a for-profit, it would be perfectly permissible, intended even, for 
the entrepreneur to put in her pocket every dollar contributed after she has provid-
ed the agreed-upon water to the one million children.   
 130 And, in fact, Malani and Posner’s initial hypothetical described a situation in 
which the “outcome” that defined a high-quality product was the provision of a “wa-
ter filtration system,” not the expenditure of a certain percentage of funds raised.  See 
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019. 
 131 Remember, this would only be the case if the cost-savings would not be pro-
duced but for the strong incentive created by the entrepreneur’s profit-sharing com-
pensation.  If she discovered and implemented those savings without strong financial 
incentives to do so, then donors would still prefer the nonprofit form.  
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uct is defined with respect to an actual quantified outcome, that out-
come must be monitored and that may involve agency costs that are 
not apparent at first blush. 
First, the hypothetical assumes that a competitor who has of-
fered to provide water to ten million Africans for ten million dollars 
has been identified.  That solves the first agency-cost issue, which is 
how the donor gets adequate pricing information about the reasona-
bly predicted cost of providing water to ten million Africans.  Without 
a sufficiently robust market for the provision of water—and a market 
that has identified the good provided with some comparable quanti-
fiable outcome—there can be no adequate pricing information to 
enable the donor to identify a “good deal” with sufficient precision. 
Presumably, the only place to get this kind of information is 
from the market of altruism providers.  So, for example, the donor 
needs to have some knowledge of the price per child of clean water as 
provided by competitors in the market.  In order to know how much 
“profit” the entrepreneur should be permitted to take, donors need 
to know what a good “price” is for the outcome they seek.  In the hy-
pothetical, they know that the “ordinary” cost is ten million dollars.  
But knowing the “ordinary” cost is dependent on identifying the out-
come with some precision.  It is only once an outcome is identified 
with precision that a market (in this case, the market for altruism) 
can provide information about the ordinary cost of such an outcome.  
In the regular market for consumer goods, we can only know how 
much we are willing to pay for a Honda Civic once we know the price 
of a Toyota Corolla.  We do not care how much profit Toyota or 
Honda are making from our purchase of their cars because we know 
how much comparatively those cars are worth.  When we are talking 
about the market for altruism, that type of pricing information is 
much harder to come by.  The difficulty in obtaining that infor-
mation is arguably an agency cost.  Unless other providers of health 
quantified their services in a reasonably comparable manner, this in-
formation is likely to be unavailable to the retail-level donor. 
Only after adequate pricing information is available do we reach 
the classic monitoring problem: the donor would need to verify that 
the high-quality product was indeed provided—that ten million chil-
dren got water on account of the donor’s contribution.  The costs of 
monitoring also include the costs associated with entering into an ad-
equately defined agreement in the first place and of enforcing that 
agreement if no high-quality product was provided. 
Finally, the donor would need to address the so-called “non-
divisibility” problem.  He would need to be able to make sure both 
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that water was provided in exchange for his contribution (and not for 
others’) and that the pricing information he obtained was relevant to 
his size of contribution and not just to overall costs.  In order to do 
that, the donor would need relatively robust information about all 
the other sources of revenue available to the entrepreneur and what 
terms were provided to those alternative sources. 
Under the hypothetical, the entrepreneur thinks she can pro-
vide the water for eight million dollars, plus her compensation, while 
the closest competitor can only provide it for ten million dollars, in-
cluding compensation.  In such an extreme case, perhaps all of the 
agency costs combined might not equal the huge savings the entre-
preneur is offering and so the for-profit model may be preferred.  
But it is much more likely that the agency costs involved would ex-
ceed the savings made possible by financial incentives for the entre-
preneur to cut costs.  For example, the two million dollar savings that 
the entrepreneur thinks she can achieve were created, after all, by a 
huge informational asymmetry.  The donors think that the water can 
be provided for ten million dollars, including reasonable salary for 
the manager.  The entrepreneur thinks that it can be provided for 
much less than that.  And remember, the donors are not using their 
own personal expertise to price the provision of water.  They have a 
presumably relatively robust market of other entrepreneurs and exist-
ing aid organizations seeking their altruism dollars to compare to the 
entrepreneur’s offer.  In other words, the donors and every other com-
peting provider of altruism in the market think that water can only be pro-
vided to the African children for ten million dollars.  But the entre-
preneur thinks that she knows better.  If the entrepreneur is wrong 
and does not achieve her projected savings of two million dollars, 
then the agency costs incurred by the donors may well exceed the ac-
tual efficiency gains provided by the entrepreneur’s genius.  A choice 
of the for-profit firm is a gamble that the entrepreneur will be able to 
find such efficiency gains.  And it is also a gamble that financial incen-
tives will produce these efficiency gains when no other incentives 
could.  If the cost of identifying, verifying, and enforcing compliance, 
and all the other agency costs identified is higher than the predicted 
efficiency gains, then a nonprofit firm would be preferred, even if the 
entrepreneur is completely self-interested. 
The nonprofit form, on the other hand, potentially mitigates all 
of these concerns.  Once the profit motive is taken away from the en-
trepreneur, then she still may provide a low-quality service, but at 
least she will not use the savings from providing a low-quality service 
to enrich herself.  If her expertise can permit her to provide high-
quality services—and save two million dollars in the process—then 
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she may be able to find some incentive to do so even if her salary in 
that year is not directly dependent on the profits earned by the firm.  
Once the strong incentive of profit is removed from the equation, the 
risk of uncertainty in monitoring product quality may decrease be-
cause the incentive to shirk has been significantly diminished. 
4. Donors Want to Enlist Entrepreneurs’ Help in Figuring 
Out How to Measure Benefit to Charitable 
Beneficiaries 
In addition to all agency costs discussed above, the most im-
portant agency cost related to many providers of charitable services 
may be the cost of quantifying benefit when the actual benefit sought 
could be misidentified.  Charities rarely define their activities in ways 
that can easily be quantified in dollar terms.  For example, CARE 
(Hansmann’s example), describes its activities as follows: “CARE tack-
les underlying causes of poverty so that people can become self-
sufficient.”
132
  While there are charities that merely distribute food to 
the hungry or medicine to the sick, charities like CARE seek to pro-
vide infrastructure development, capacity-building, micro-credit, or 
other assistance that is designed, or at least described, as providing 
the possibility to “tackle[] underlying causes of poverty” rather than 
just alleviate suffering.
133
  Any charity that attempts to define its pur-
pose in functional terms will have trouble defining a sufficiently pre-
cise agreement with donors as to some identifiable quantum of bene-
fit to be provided. 
Furthermore, even if a sufficiently precise agreement could be 
reached, efficiency may be lost from the precision of the agreement 
itself.  This type of agreement would be inherently inflexible (if it 
could be enforced).  If, for example, the best way to provide clean 
water were to change from well-digging to rainwater harvesting or the 
best way to provide health were to change from the provision of water 
to the provision of immunizations, then amending the agreement 
may be expensive.  This inflexibility is an agency cost. 
In fact, one of the things a donor is often seeking in the exper-
tise of the entrepreneur is advice about the best method to eradicate 
poverty, for example.  He does not just want the entrepreneur to be 
skilled at reducing administering funds so that a substantial portion 
“goes” to the ultimate recipient.  Nor does he want the entrepreneur 
merely to provide a quantity of water cheaply.  Rather, he wants the 
 
 132 What We Do, CARE, http://www.care.org/careswork/whatwedo/index.asp (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
 133 Id. 
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entrepreneur to devise some means to leverage his donation and ac-
tually reduce poverty.  He wants substantive expertise.  Quantifying 
the benefit to the poor children in terms of dollars that “go” to them 
does a poor job of measuring benefit.  Even quantifying the benefit as 
a certain number of children receiving clean water does a poor job of 
measuring benefit.  Good charities use the money they collect in in-
novative ways that—at least donors hope—will have a bigger benefit 
than merely sending dollars to the beneficiaries or providing easily 
quantified goods to them.  The cost of permitting the entrepreneur 
to innovate and of structuring the transaction to encourage that in-
novation without overly incentivizing shirking on quality is also argu-
ably an agency cost. 
In other words, one could imagine situations in which the defi-
nition of a high-quality output is even more difficult to identify or 
measure than in either of the hypotheticals.  While it may be imagi-
nable how one would count cost effectively that are dollars going di-
rectly to the beneficiaries, or count number of children benefitted, it 
is much harder to make such an evaluation when the donor wants to 
provide flexibility to enable the entrepreneur to use the money in the 
most beneficial way.  If there are changing circumstances, it may be 
preferable to leave the entrepreneur some flexibility to react to 
changing circumstances.  In the charitable context, the outcome is 
often very hard to quantify, and so agency costs are often prohibitive-
ly high.  In these situations, the “non-divisibility” problem really 
comes to the fore.  If a donor wants to get guidance from the entre-
preneur about the best use of funds or if he wants to leave the entre-
preneur the flexibility to change uses to address changing circum-
stances, imagining an agreement that specifies which benefits were 
derived from which dollars donated is even more daunting.  It be-
comes very clear why a donor under these circumstances would want 
a general solution to all these problems, such as the one provided by 
the non-distribution constraint, even understanding that there might 
be substantial efficiency losses caused by the removal of financial in-
centives for the entrepreneur to institute cost-saving mechanisms. 
C. Conclusion of Part II 
The above analysis suggests that under the most common cir-
cumstances, it is extremely unlikely that donors will choose to meet 
their altruism needs in a transaction with a for-profit organization.  
The agency costs associated with identifying a measurable output that 
can solve the problems associated with the non-divisible tendencies of 
altruism, as well as the more traditionally recognized costs of moni-
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toring and enforcing compliance with the agreement once it is 
formed, are likely to overwhelm any efficiency gains that could be ob-
tained through providing the entrepreneur with a profits-based com-
pensation structure.
134
  But this observation still does not explain why 
the government should deny tax benefits to a donor who identifies a 
situation in which he believes that efficiency gains from a profits-
based compensation structure would be greater than losses from in-
creased transaction costs.
135
  I have not yet explained why the gov-
ernment should deny a tax deduction to a donor who wishes to donate 
to a for-profit organization when that donor thinks such an organiza-
tion can provide altruism to him in the most economically efficient 
manner. 
The following two Parts of this Article seek to provide an expla-
nation for why at least the tax benefit of deductible contributions 
should be reserved for donations to organizations bound by the non-
distribution constraint.  Part III seeks to explain why the govern-
ment’s own agency-cost analysis counsels in favor of providing tax 
benefits only to firms that accept a single standard version of the non-
distribution constraint and to deny it to those firms that have no non-
distribution constraint or insist on crafting their own non-distribution 
constraint through private contracts.  Part IV seeks to explain that 
contrary to Malani and Posner’s assumption, current nonprofit law 
actually permits incentive-based compensation to nonprofit employ-
ees in any situation in which some measurable metric of success can 
be identified (other than pure “net profits”).  Thus, the problem 
identified by Malani and Posner is not nearly as significant as they 
suggest.    
 
 134 Oliver Hart’s work on public versus private ownership of public services sup-
ports the point made in this Article he argues that private ownership encourages 
cost-saving innovation but that it also encourages “quality-shading” innovation.  Hart, 
supra note 113, at C71 “The choice between public and private ownership depends 
on which of these effects is more important.” Id. 
 135 As Hansmann notes,  
A more fundamental problem with such a theory, however, is that it is 
not obvious why a subsidy is needed to encourage nonprofits even 
where their development seems appropriate as a response to contract 
failure.  Why can consumers not be trusted to select nonprofit rather 
than proprietary producers on their own in those situations in which 
nonprofits are to be expected to offer more reliable service?   
Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 70. 
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III.  ACCOUNTING FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST:  
A MODEL WITH THREE ACTORS 
But why should the government reserve tax benefits exclusively 
to nonprofit charities?  In fact, it appears that donors and entrepre-
neurs should be able to figure out that the nonprofit form is the best 
structure for their donative charities without any “nudge” from the 
government.  The agency theory can be used not only to understand 
the motivations of donors and entrepreneurs in a transaction for 
charitable goods, but also to understand the motivations of the gov-
ernment itself.  At least one reason why contributions to nonprofit 
charitable organizations are tax deductible, while contributions to 
for-profit charities are not, is because the government’s own agency-
cost analysis counsels in favor of the non-distribution constraint 
whenever the government seeks to provide tax subsidies for charita-
ble goods. 
In order to evaluate the choices the government should rational-
ly make in providing tax benefits to charities, I initially assume that 
the government wants to provide some sort of charitable goods.  That 
is, the government has determined that there is a reason to provide 
certain charitable goods.  Justifications for providing tax benefits to 
providers of charitable goods are legion.
136
  One widely accepted eco-
nomic justification for providing tax benefits to providers of public 
goods is that because of the free-riding problem, these goods will be 
undersupplied by regular market mechanisms.  Because third-party 
goods arguably are “non-divisible” (which is a close correlate of the 
quality of “non-exclusivity”), they too will be undersupplied by regu-
lar market mechanisms.  A government subsidy increases the likeli-
hood that such services will be provided at socially optimal levels.
137
  
This justification for the government providing charitable goods is 
well accepted, but—as Malani and Posner point out—it does not pro-
vide a justification for the government to provide public goods 
through nonprofit firms as opposed to for-profit firms.
138
  My goal is 
to assess whether the government is rational to restrict the provision 
of tax benefits to nonprofit organizations—those organizations 
bound by the non-distribution constraint. 
 
 136 For an excellent overview of “measurement” and “subsidy” theories, see Mi-
randa Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Jus-
tice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 514–27 (2010).  She argues that the justification is not 
complete until distributive justice concerns are more fully integrated.  Id. at 528–53.    
 137 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 47. 
 138 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2011. 
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Once it is assumed that the government wants to provide chari-
table goods, the government’s methods for doing so can be assessed.  
This Article derived a “formula” for determining when a donor would 
choose the nonprofit form.  The formulation was as follows: the non-
profit form will be chosen whenever the cost of monitoring and enforcing a spe-
cific level of product quality exceeds the gains that are expected to accrue from 
providing the entrepreneur with strong incentives to implement cost-saving ef-
ficiencies.
139
  In other words, if the so-called agency costs are high 
enough to make the donor fear that permitting the entrepreneur to 
take a profit interest in the transaction would result in shirking on 
quality, the donor is rational to seek to impose a non-distribution 
constraint. 
If it is correct that the donor would be prudent to engage in 
some sort of agency-cost analysis before making a donation to a chari-
table entity that compensated its entrepreneur with the “profits” from 
the firm, it also seems prudent for the government to engage in a 
similar type of agency-cost analysis before providing public goods.  
This seems like an obvious observation, but it appears to have been 
rarely appreciated.
140
  If the justification for the government provid-
ing tax benefits is that it seeks to subsidize the provision of a certain 
type of goods, the government is not just a regulator of the market 
but a participant in the market for those goods.  It seeks to provide 
resources to further the production or acquisition of those identified 
goods.  As a market participant in the provision of charitable goods, 
the government presumably has the same agency-cost concerns as do 
private participants in the market for such goods.  Just like donors to 
charitable organizations, the government needs to assess how it can 
 
 139 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 140 Henry Hansmann recognized in passing that the government is, in effect, a 
market participant when it provides tax benefits to charitable organizations.  See 
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 605 (“To be sure, federal tax law does effec-
tively make the government a patron of many nonprofits, and to this extent the gov-
ernment has an interest in policing the behavior of nonprofits that is much like that 
of any other patron. . . .  For the limited group that both qualify for the charitable 
deduction and receive considerable donative support, the government is in effect a 
substantial contributor.”); Henry Hansmann, What is the Appropriate Structure for Non-
profit Corporations Law? 22 (Yale Univ. Inst. for Soc. and Policy Studies Program on 
Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 100, 1985) (“[O]ne important reason that stat-
utes providing subsidies and special preferences require that the recipient organiza-
tions be nonprofit is presumably that these statutes are providing donations of a sort 
to these organizations, and seek the fiduciary restraints of the nonprofit form for the 
same reasons of contract failure as do other Donors.”)  Subsequently, Atkinson has 
made this point.  Atkinson, supra note 70, at 516 n.55 (citing Hansmann, Role, supra 
note 16, at 847); see also Estelle James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 397, 408 (1987).  
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obtain charitable goods most efficiently, given that the people who 
actually provide them—the government’s “agents” in the transac-
tion—may be motivated by financial incentives.
141
 
A. The Government’s Provision of Public Goods 
If public goods and third-party goods create problems for do-
nors, they presumably create similar problems for the government.  
Namely, the cost of monitoring the quality of the output of providers 
of third-party goods may be prohibitively high for the government.  
Even more problematic may be the “non-divisibility” problem.  That 
is, the government may also have difficulty making sure that a provid-
er of a public good does not just “re-sell” the very same goods to oth-
er donors after the government has made its contribution. 
Of course, the government has many tools to avoid these prob-
lems.  First, it could review each transaction to determine whether 
there is a measurable output that can be identified with a high-quality 
product.  If the government can identify such a measure of quality 
and it is relatively inexpensive to bind the entrepreneur to providing 
a high-quality product, then the government may consider permitting 
the entrepreneur to assume the financial risk and benefit from 
providing that product efficiently.  That is, if the government can 
cost-effectively identify and enforce a high-quality product require-
ment, then it may choose to structure its transaction as a for-profit.
142
  
The government does this all the time when it provides public goods 
through contracts with for-profit firms, as Malani and Posner recog-
nize.
143
  But note that the government will not contract with a for-
profit firm for the provision of public goods if it cannot identify a 
measurable output and bind the firm to the provision of high-quality 
goods in a relatively cost-effective way.
144
  Hansmann’s “contract fail-
 
 141 The implication of this observation is that charities are the “agents” not only of 
their donors, who assume the role of principal by virtue of their “altruistic” dona-
tions, but also of the government, which assumes the role of principal by virtue of its 
tax subsidies for “charitable” activities. 
 142 Remember, if the government cannot identify a high-quality product so that it 
can bind the entrepreneur to providing that quality of product before calculating 
her profit, then structuring the transaction as a for-profit is inefficient.  The Entre-
preneur (assuming she is not altruistic) will simply shirk on quality in order to cap-
ture increased profits and will have a lessened incentive to provide the product effi-
ciently. 
 143 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2051 (“[T]he government can purchase pub-
lic goods through ordinary procedures for government procurement, which include 
competitive bidding.”). 
 144 The government’s choice between providing services itself or through a for-
profit partner is addressed in the economic literature on privatization.  As Hart, 
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ure” can afflict contracts with the government as well as contracts 
with individual market participants. 
What can the government do if “contract failure” prevents it 
from contracting effectively with for-profit providers of public goods?  
Most obviously, it can provide the services itself, using its own em-
ployees.
145
  These employees are usually compensated with “fixed” sal-
aries, and so the use of such employees to provide public goods repli-
cates the “non-distribution constraint” as a solution to the agency-cost 
problem.
146
  Collecting tax revenue is perhaps an apt example of why 
the government may choose to use its own employees rather than a 
for-profit firm to provide a public good.  A “high-quality good” for 
the purposes of tax collection is collecting the taxes that are owed 
under the law.  This is an inherently difficult thing for the govern-
ment to measure ex ante, and thus to construct a contract that would 
effectively define the proper collection would be prohibitively expen-
sive.  It is presumably easy to attempt to maximize tax revenue by ag-
gressively pursuing non-meritorious claims, but this approach would 
not be in the government’s interest.  The government has deter-
mined that the potential efficiency gains to be derived from provid-
ing financial incentives to those actually enforcing the tax laws are 
less than the costs of effectively monitoring whether they are provid-
ing a high quality product or whether they are enriching themselves 
by shirking on quality. 
B. The Government’s Provision of Public Goods Through Tax Benefits 
Thus, when the government seeks to provide charitable goods, it 
should perform some sort of agency-cost analysis to decide if it should 
provide those goods through a “for-profit” or a “nonprofit” mecha-
 
Shleifer, and Vishny point out, “[T]he fundamental difference between private and 
public ownership concerns the allocation of residual control rights . . . .”  Oliver 
Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an 
Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127, 1129 (1997).  They conclude that “the pri-
vate contractor’s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong since he 
ignores the adverse impact on quality.”  Id.  They also argue that “providing an agent 
with strong incentives to pursue one objective, such as profits, can lead to his shirk-
ing on other objectives, such as quality.”  Id. at 1131.    
 145 Rob Atkinson has recently pointed out that defenders of nonprofit charity of-
ten imply that government provision of charitable goods is somehow inherently less 
efficient than nonprofit provision of those same goods.  See Atkinson, supra note 15, 
at 249.  I do not mean to imply that.  Rather, each compensation structure has its 
own efficiencies and inefficiencies that apply differently in different situations. 
 146 There are also mechanisms available to the government that occupy an analyt-
ic category between contracting with a for-profit firm and providing the services it-
self, such as cost-plus contracting and providing incentive pay to government em-
ployees. 
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nism.  If it chooses a nonprofit form, then it can provide the goods 
“itself” by using its own employees or it can provide them indirectly 
through a nonprofit partner.  But the question that I seek to answer 
here is not whether the government should always provide charitable 
goods through nonprofit firms, but whether the government should 
require the non-distribution constraint when it seeks to provide char-
itable goods through tax benefits.  The theory of “dual contract fail-
ure” seeks to explain why it is beneficial for the government to pro-
vide at least some charitable goods through tax benefits, instead of 
directly.
147
  The agency theory provides another justification for the 
government providing charitable goods through tax benefits instead 
of directly, specifically by justifying reserving the deduction of chari-
table contributions for contributions to nonprofit firms. 
Generally, theorists have justified the government’s provision of 
public goods through tax subsidies for nonprofit providers by arguing 
that the government cannot supply optimally some public goods.
148
  
They posit that because the government cannot correct optimally the 
“market failure” that accompanies some public goods, the production 
of these public goods is beset by “government failure” as well.  Specif-
ically, “the government will be unable to overcome a market failure 
when demand for a given public good is heterogeneous, and the 
amount each voter demands varies.”
149
  A subsidy for the provision of 
such goods through the charitable sector thus serves the interests of 
correcting those market failures that the government is unlikely to 
correct directly and therefore promotes diversity in charitable objec-
tives.
150
 
The agency theory provides another justification for the gov-
ernment providing charitable goods through a deduction for chari-
table contributions.  As discussed above, when the government pro-
vides charitable goods directly, it must evaluate each transaction 
individually and perform a case-by-case analysis of the agency costs 
involved in ensuring a high-quality product.  It would have to review 
each transaction to determine whether the charitable outcome is eas-
 
 147 See generally Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in 
a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY, supra note 16, at 21(arguing that nonprofits arise to provide 
public goods that neither the private market nor the government sector would oth-
erwise provide); BURTON WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988)(same).   
 148 See generally Weisbrod, supra note 147; WEISBROD, supra note 147. 
 149 Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 165, 186 (2008). 
 150 See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404–09 (1998).  For 
an important recent refinement of this theory, see Benshalom, supra note 59.   
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ily measurable and to craft a means of enforcing the provision of a 
high-quality product in each case.  But the costs involved in investi-
gating each transaction are agency costs.  In cases in which the gov-
ernment does evaluate each transaction individually, it can make deci-
sions about whether to fund an activity through a for-profit partner, 
whether to fund an organization through a nonprofit partner, or 
whether to perform the activity itself.  While the government could 
provide its subsidy through tax benefits after conducting a case-by-
case analysis of a transaction, this case-by-case evaluation will presum-
ably be very costly. 
It is the very nature of tax benefits that they be provided to a rel-
atively broad class of recipients.  The laws that define who may bene-
fit and when are written ex ante and structure an indefinite number 
of individual transactions.  The government need not evaluate each 
transaction individually to determine how it could best minimize 
agency costs and maximize the efficient provision of the charitable 
goods it seeks.  Given the large number of transactions that tax bene-
fits may apply to, how would the government best structure those 
benefits to maximize the chance that they are used to provide benefi-
cial goods or services and minimize the agency costs associated with 
providing such services?  Structuring the government’s role in the 
provision of charitable goods inherently reduces agency costs in-
volved in providing such goods.
151
 
Even more important than the savings that come from the gov-
ernment avoiding a case-by-case evaluation of how to provide charita-
ble goods, is the government’s benefit from the donors’ participation 
in the transaction when it structures the provision of charitable good 
as a tax deduction.  When the government structures its subsidy as a 
tax deduction, it only provides the subsidy to organizations that tax-
payers have identified as worthy of the deduction.  Furthermore, 
providing the subsidy in the form of a deduction forces taxpayers to 
vote with their wallet, so to speak, by only giving the subsidy to those 
organizations to which taxpayers make voluntary contributions and in 
relative proportion to the dollars contributed.
152
  This choice of struc-
ture for the subsidy allows the government to leverage the choices of 
millions of taxpayers and to use those taxpayers’ choices of worthy 
causes and organizations to make its own decisions about which caus-
 
 151 Brian Galle argues that a regime that requires “explicit government judgments 
about the value of a charity’s output . . . is precisely what the law of charities, as cur-
rently constructed, is designed to prevent.”  Galle, supra note 15, at 1228. 
 152 This argument does not apply only to a subsidy in the form of a tax deduction, 
but also to a tax credit or governmental matching grant.   
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es and organizations to support.
153
  If we could exclude egoistic pur-
poses in an expenditure, then the expenditures that donors make 
would reflect their judgment about “worthy” charitable causes and in-
stitutions.
154
  These choices are aggregated in a market mechanism 
when donors make contributions to charities.
155
 
As David Schizer has recently pointed out, when the government 
provides subsidies for the provision of public goods through a tax 
deduction, it not only enlists the assistance of taxpayers in choosing 
causes or providers but it also “recruit[s] private donors to monitor 
the quality of nonprofits, so that the government can piggyback on 
these quality-control efforts.”
156
  It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to discuss this insight in depth since to do so would involve an analy-
sis of the tools the government could use to identify “trustworthy” 
donors and those that should not be trusted, which Schizer only be-
 
 153 The government traditionally restricts the types of organizations that can re-
ceive tax-deductible contributions, although there is a case to be made that it should 
provide the subsidy to any organization to which taxpayers make true contributions.  
See, e.g., Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 88 (“Indeed, the wisest course is 
probably just to assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that all nonprofits that re-
ceive a substantial fraction of their income in the form of donations are operating in 
an environment of contract failure, and therefore merit the exemption on efficiency 
grounds.”); see also JOHN D. COLUMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX 
EXEMPTION 193 (1995). 
 154 The non-distribution constraint serves to maximize the chances that the ser-
vices are socially beneficial by leveraging the financial choices of donors.  Above, I dis-
cussed the somewhat elusive question of what exactly donors are trying to do when 
they donate money to charities.  I suggested that at least some of what they are doing 
is purchasing a benefit for someone other than themselves.  I called this other-
directed benefit “altruism” even though I conceded that some portion of the altru-
ism they purchase is probably related to the “good feelings” (warm glow) they get 
from donating.  Millions of citizen-donors make choices every year about where to 
donate their money.  If the government could isolate those donations that are in ef-
fect purchases of altruism, then they would be gathering a tremendous amount of 
information about organizations and activities that donors believe improve the 
world.   
 155 Obviously, not all donations are purchases of altruism.  Some may be masked 
payments for private goods or services.  The non-distribution constraint is at least 
one mechanism the government can use to identify the transactions that are pur-
chases of altruism.  When the donor cannot benefit financially from the transaction, 
then the government can rule out financial motivations from the transaction and can 
make a somewhat more educated guess that altruism motivates the transaction.  
Thus, we exclude quid pro quo transactions from the definition of “contributions” 
worthy of the tax deduction.  The non-distribution constraint has a role in ensuring 
that a donor’s contribution is “altruistic” by limiting the types of financial returns he 
can make from giving money to the charity.  As discussed supra note 84, this Article 
focuses on the non-distribution constraint’s effect on providers of labor, not capital, 
and thus a full discussion of the importance of the non-distribution constraint’s ef-
fect on donors and other providers of capital is saved for a later time. 
 156 Schizer, supra note 15, at 224.  
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gan to sketch out.
157
  But it is enough here to identify the fact that the 
government’s choice of a tax deduction as at least one method for 
providing a subsidy for charitable goods has the potential to be the 
most efficient means of providing such goods because of the agency 
costs saved in leveraging (rather than pointlessly replicating) taxpay-
er effort. 
The ability to leverage taxpayers’ choices of cause and organiza-
tion and the taxpayers’ monitoring efforts have immense agency-cost 
implications for the government.  As discussed above, the govern-
ment could (and does) individually evaluate many possible public 
and third-party goods and provides the ones that it determines to be 
socially optimal either through its own employees or through con-
tracts with for-profit providers.  This process, however, has costs—
agency costs.  Finding a mechanism to enlist taxpayer assistance and 
to piggyback on taxpayer efforts in these processes has the potential 
to save the government substantial costs.  Of course, this strategy can 
only be effective if taxpayer choice of organizations worthy of chari-
table contributions generally identifies organizations that actually de-
serve a government subsidy. 
C. So, Why Not Permit Tax-Deductible Contributions to For-Profit 
Charities?  The Theory of Imperfect Consumers 
If the government is so keen on leveraging taxpayers’ decision-
making, then why not permit the taxpayer to make the decision 
whether to contribute to a nonprofit or a for-profit charity?  If agency 
theory predicts that consumers will select either the nonprofit form 
or the for-profit form when the respective form is most efficient, then 
Malani and Posner rightly ask why not just trust consumers to choose 
the right form to provide charitable goods and subsidize the provi-
sion of those goods whether they are provided through a nonprofit 
or for-profit form?  Just because the agency theory predicts that the 
nonprofit form will almost always be the most efficient way to struc-
ture the provision of third-party and public goods is no good reason 
in itself to condition tax benefits on nonprofit status.  Why not give 
the same benefits to for-profit providers of such services if donors want 
to donate money to them? 
 One possibility is that the answer has something to do with tax-
payer knowledge.
158
  That is, to explain the choice of subsidizing only 
 
 157 See supra note 84. 
 158 The answer may also have to do with taxpayers’ interests, of course.  If the tax-
payers’ interests diverge from those of the government, then the government cannot 
trust the taxpayers’ choices when it seeks to provide subsidies for charitable goods.  A 
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transactions subject to the non-distribution constraint, we need a 
theory that explains why taxpayers are good at choosing worthy caus-
es and providers, but potentially not always as good at deciding 
whether those providers should be nonprofit or for-profit.  Remem-
ber, consumers are almost always likely to choose a nonprofit provid-
er for charitable goods.
159
  What I am looking for is an explanation 
why, in the rare cases that taxpayers choose a for-profit provider in-
stead, the government may be suspicious of that choice and may de-
cide to refuse to provide tax benefits to the for-profit provider.  The 
agency-cost theory  is exactly that. 
Malani and Posner briefly describe one possible explanation why 
the government would choose to restrict tax deductions to nonprofit 
charities: consumers might choose for-profit providers of charitable 
goods because they are confused or deceived, and thus it would be ill-
advised for the government to rely on their choice of transaction 
structure when making its own decision to whom to provide its subsi-
dy.
160
  The government does not want to provide tax benefits to for-
profit providers of such goods if the only reason donors might choose 
them is because of confusion, ignorance, or fraud.  Malani and Pos-
ner call this the “Theory of Imperfect Consumers.”
161
 
Malani and Posner do an excellent job of describing the prob-
lem concisely: 
Because the tax break is keyed to the Donor’s personal allocation 
to charities, it effectively delegates power over government ex-
penditure to the Donor.  For the same reason that the Donor 
[may be] a poor decisionmaker for her own allocations, she is a 
poor agent to control the government’s expenditures.  This is why 
the tax breaks must be restricted to firms that cannot distribute 
profits.  It is a way to protect the government from imperfect Do-
nors.
162
 
Malani and Posner’s primary solution to the problem of “imperfect 
consumers” is to argue that if consumers are imperfect, then there 
should be no tax deductions for charitable contributions.
163
  If the 
government thinks that it is appropriate to subsidize the provision of 
certain goods, like public goods or third-party goods, then it should 
 
treatment of this “theory of diverging interests” is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. 
 159 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 160 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2050. 
 161 Id.   
 162 Id. at 2051. 
 163 Id. 
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choose its own recipients and pay them directly.
164
  Malani and Posner 
state, “[T]he government can purchase public goods through ordi-
nary procedures for government procurement, which include com-
petitive bidding.”
165
 
As discussed above, Malani and Posner’s suggestion risks losing a 
tremendous quantity of potential efficiency gains if taxpayer choices 
have any value.  If the government went through its own process of 
choosing public goods and providers, it would lose the value of lever-
aging taxpayer choices.  It would also lose the ability to save its own 
agency costs by piggybacking on the monitoring ability of a large and 
diverse market for charitable goods. 
Malani and Posner acknowledge that there is a value in the gov-
ernment providing some avenue other than the political process for 
citizens to choose priorities of government spending on public 
goods.
166
  In response, they suggest an alternative plan: if the govern-
ment wants to provide some direct input from citizens about what to 
fund,  they should let citizens choose (for example on their tax re-
turns) a type of activity that should be funded; then “the government 
would accumulate these dollars [allocated by citizens] and choose an 
organization to receive such dollars.”
167
  The government could then 
subsidize an organization of its own choice that conducts the activity 
chosen by the taxpayers.
168
  In this proposal, the government main-
tains the benefits of taxpayer choice of activity but gives up the bene-
fits of leveraging taxpayer choice of organization, as well as the benefit 
of donor monitoring discussed by Schizer.  Furthermore, by simply 
voting to allocate federal dollars, the taxpayer is less invested in her 
choices.  It is plausible to conclude that a taxpayer pays more atten-
tion even to the choice of activity when she is contributing her own 
money to support it than when she simply makes a preference known 
on a piece of paper sent to the government.  This proposal, then, 
while slightly better than just repealing the deduction for charitable 
contributions, still risks losing the potential value of leveraging a 
 
 164 Id. at 2052.  Malani and Posner also cover their bases by arguing that “imper-
fect consumers” are not a problem because consumer-protection laws can protect 
them against fraud.  Id. at 2051.  Of course, fraud is only one reason why consumers 
are imperfect, and anti-fraud laws provide limited protection even against fraud. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2030 (explaining that the “public goods the-
ory” justifies the government providing a tax subsidy for the provision of charitable 
goods, and stating that “we will assume that it is correct for the purposes of our ar-
gument”).  
 167 Id. at 2051. 
 168 Id. 
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market of taxpayer choices of providers and taxpayers’ monitoring of 
quality. 
Neither proposal is necessary, however, if taxpayer ignorance 
does not apply equally to all choices taxpayers must make in choosing 
a charity.  Taxpayers may be quite adept at choosing the types of 
charitable goods that are worthy of support and even the organiza-
tions that should be supported, but sometimes, they are poor choos-
ers whether to compensate the entrepreneurs who provide such char-
itable goods with a “profits” interest.  Remember, taxpayers have to 
be good enough only at choosing activities and organizations that 
make their aggregated choices better and cheaper than those made 
by the government.  Thus, Malani and Posner’s response to the pos-
sibility of taxpayers’ ignorance is an overreaction if taxpayers’ igno-
rance is related specifically to the choice of the non-distribution con-
straint and is not more inclusive. 
Why might we assume that the small number of consumers who 
choose the for-profit form to provide charitable goods do so because 
they are ignorant, confused, or deceived?  First, the nonprofit form is 
so prevalent for providers of charitable goods that donors might as-
sume that any provider of charitable goods is bound by the non-
distribution constraint.  People are genuinely confused by the distinc-
tion between “nonprofit” organizations and providers of charity.  
They assume that they are the same thing.  Therefore, consumers 
who choose for-profit providers of charity may think those providers 
are constrained like nonprofits when in fact they are not.
169
 
But even more importantly, the whole point of the non-
distribution constraint is that the donor’s agency costs are minimized 
if he largely delegates the monitoring and enforcement of the constraint to the 
government.  In other words, contract failure means that consumers 
cannot do what they ordinarily do in a transaction—monitor the 
quality of the goods provided.  In response to this contract failure 
they substitute something that can be monitored—compensation to 
the entrepreneur—and hope that because the entrepreneur cannot 
personally use the excess value, the excess value will be used to pro-
vide charitable goods.  They retain some ability to monitor the non-
distribution constraint (for example, by looking at the entrepreneur’s 
compensation on the charity’s Forms 990), but they mainly delegate 
 
 169 For example, people asked to contribute to organizations in traditionally chari-
table areas, like education, may assume that those organizations are nonprofits, or 
are somehow constrained by something like the non-distribution constraint, even 
when they are not.   
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that responsibility to the government.
170
  The government then moni-
tors and enforces the non-distribution constraint with respect to the 
charity’s management.  Agency costs are reduced sufficiently thereby 
that a market for charitable goods is possible.   
If donors depend on the government to monitor the non-
distribution constraint, then it makes perfect sense that they may 
sometimes be confused about it.  The donors rely on the government 
to prevent the entrepreneur from pocketing their contributions 
when, in fact, there may be nothing in their agreement with the en-
trepreneur preventing such result.  Thus, it is entirely reasonable for 
the government to reach the conclusion that the non-distribution 
constraint is necessary to the efficient provision of public and third-
party goods.  The donor is implicitly depending on it.  It is also en-
tirely reasonable for the government to maintain this conclusion even 
in the rare case in which a donor wants to provide charitable goods 
through a for-profit organization.  That donor may well be confused 
about the effect of removing the non-distribution constraint in that 
case.  This confusion does not call into question the value of the do-
nors’ (the market’s) choices about what charitable goods are worth 
funding and what organizations are the best providers of them.  It is 
limited to an unusual choice about something that the structure of 
the transaction generally requires the consumer to delegate to the 
government. 
Therefore, in the usual case in which no compelling measure of 
quality can be identified in a cost-effective way, the government 
should insist on providing a tax deduction for contributions only to 
nonprofit charities, even if some confused donors would prefer to 
contribute to for-profit charities. 
D. What About Malani and Posner’s Hypothetical? 
In Part II, I discussed the fact that Malani and Posner’s example 
of a “for-profit” charity was one in which the entrepreneur had iden-
tified a plausible definition of a high-quality charitable good for the 
donor.  In that hypothetical, the entrepreneur had promised the do-
nor that eighty percent of all contributions would “go to” poor Afri-
can children.
171
  Assuming that it is possible, at least conceptually, for 
“go to” to have a meaning, the eighty percent promise constitutes a 
 
 170 As Schizer points out, their monitoring may still be robust under certain cir-
cumstances.  Schizer, supra note 15, at 258. 
   
 171 For previous discussion of this hypothetical, see supra notes 119–121 and ac-
companying text. 
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meaningful definition of a high-quality good.  Malani and Posner 
then posited that the remaining twenty percent of every contribution 
would be split between “administrative costs” and compensation for 
the entrepreneur.
172
  They argued that permitting the entrepreneur 
to keep whatever money she saves from providing administrative ser-
vices relating to the charity more cheaply than was predicted would 
promote efficiency.
173
  That would incentivize her to find the most ef-
ficient way to provide those services.  Assuming that “administrative 
costs” are such that there is no way for the entrepreneur to enrich 
herself by shirking on the quality of those services, this claim is plau-
sible.  If the government prevented that kind of arrangement, then it 
seems that it might be doing us all a disservice by preventing an effi-
ciency-enhancing structure from being adopted. 
In the next Part of the Article, I survey the current law relating 
to compensation of charity managers and find that what Malani and 
Posner call a “for-profit” compensation structure is actually perfectly 
compatible with the nonprofit form under current law.  But before 
moving on, it is worth pointing out that the government’s own agen-
cy-cost analysis may rationally require that the government prevent 
what might, in some specific circumstance, be the most efficient 
structure for a transaction.  That is because if the government is to 
reduce agency-costs in the provision of charitable goods, it has to 
make rules that are generally applicable to whole classes of transactions, 
and it needs to be able to enforce the same rules to a very large num-
ber of transactions.  The main agency cost that the government seeks 
to save when it provides a subsidy for the provision of charitable 
goods in the form of a tax deduction is the cost involved in evaluating 
each transaction, customizing a contract to govern that particular 
transaction, and enforcing multiple different contractual terms.  For 
the non-distribution constraint to work, the government needs to 
identify something it can observe (compensation to charity employ-
ees, for example), it needs to make rules about which types of com-
pensation are permissible and which are not, and it needs to enforce 
those rules.  The health of the nonprofit sector depends on the gov-
ernment being able to do that well and cheaply.  Thus, if a particular 
compensation structure generally reduces efficiency, the government 
may choose to prevent organizations from using it even if it may en-
hances efficiency in certain specific circumstances. 
 
 172 Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027. 
 173 Id.  
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For example, Malani and Posner point out that a for-profit firm 
“can promise Donors, by contract, that it will not distribute profits to 
its managers or workers.”
174
  They argue that these private contracts 
could be “part of the sales contract for that product,” and that the en-
trepreneur could “hire an auditor” to ensure that the for-profit chari-
ty is abiding by the terms of the contract.
175
  Since for-profit firms can 
replicate the non-distribution constraint through private contracts of 
various sorts, Malani and Posner ask why they should not be permit-
ted the same tax benefits as nonprofit firms that constrain themselves 
through the non-distribution constraint provided under the Internal 
Revenue Code.
176
 
The problem with allowing  tax-deductible contributions to for-
profit firms that engage in these types of private contractual substi-
tutes for the non-distribution constraint is simply that these con-
straints are private contracts.  From the government’s perspective, it is 
reasonable ’to provide governmental subsidy only to transactions 
that, in effect, use its own standardized contractual terms.
177
  If the 
government needs to monitor and enforce the terms of the agree-
ment, then of course it wants those terms to be standard.  The law of 
tax-exempt organizations is the set of standardized terms under 
which the government provides subsidies to providers of charitable 
goods.  The non-distribution constraint is the heart of that set of 
standardized contracts, and the government is rational in its choice 
to value generality, administrability, simplicity, and enforceability as 
parts of its own agency-cost analysis when deciding which transactions 
to subsidize.
178
 
 
 174 Id. at 2035.   
 175 Malani and Posner also suggest that the for-profit firm could institute a “cost-
plus pricing system” by “billing the donor after all costs have been tallied and the 
product has been delivered.”  Id. at 2036.  This cost-plus system would presumably 
also be defined in a private contract and enforced through regular contract law. 
 176 Id. at 2060.  For a response, see generally Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, 
at 516–18. 
 177 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 85 (2d ed. 1977) (stating 
that a seller might employ a standard or form contract when “he wishes to avoid the 
costs involved in negotiating and drafting a separate agreement with each purchaser 
[since] [t]hese costs are likely to be very high for a large organization that engages in 
so many transactions that it must adopt routine procedures for the guidance of its 
line personnel”). 
 178 After recognizing that private parties could create private contractual forms of 
the non-distribution constraint, Hansmann notes that “[t]he advantage of the non-
profit form, then, is that it economizes on contracting and enforcement.”  
Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 853.  This Article points out that it economizes on 
enforcement not only for the donors, but also for the government, even though the 
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Malani and Posner’s example of the organization that promises 
to cause eighty percent of the funds to “go to” the African children is 
a case in point.  Even though this “hybrid” model—in which the non-
distribution constraint is confined to one part of the agreement—
may be more efficient than a strictly nonprofit model under certain 
specific circumstances, it would be rational for the government to re-
fuse to provide a tax deduction for contributions to such a structure.  
That is because the government might conclude that the agency costs 
saved by enforcing a single standard non-distribution constraint out-
weigh those efficiency gains potentially available from permitting or-
ganizations to isolate administrative costs by customizing a private 
non-distribution constraint.  Thus, the coupling of the non-
distribution constraint with tax benefits for donative charities is justi-
fied by the government’s need to reduce agency costs by providing a 
standard set of rules about permissible compensation. 
The next Part of this Article surveys current law and finds that it 
permits nonprofits to use the hybrid structure described by Malani 
and Posner.  In other words, entrepreneurs may customize many pos-
sible incentive compensation structures while still permitting their 
donors to receive a deduction for their contributions.  The entrepre-
neurs are only prohibited from tying compensation directly to profits.  
That is, they can receive the precise incentives that Malani and Pos-
ner think would add efficiency to the provision of charitable goods.  
But entrepreneurs must do so in a way that does not egregiously 
permit the providers of charitable goods from profiting by shirking 
on quality—the exact concern the non-distribution constraint is de-
signed to address. 
IV. COMPENSATION AND THE NON-DISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT UNDER 
CURRENT LAW 
I noted previously that any transaction that solves the non-
divisibility problem associated with the provision of public and third-
party goods identifies a measurable output to which compensation 
can be tied.  Malani and Posner’s hypothetical does this in a way that 
expressly mimics the non-distribution constraint by setting a fixed 
percentage of all donations that must be used for charitable purposes 
and permitting the entrepreneur to keep any of the remaining mon-
ey she does not spend on “administrative costs.”  But I suggested oth-
er possibilities, like agreements in which an organization would pro-
vide a set quantum of clean water for African villagers for each dollar 
 
government assumes the enforcement role when the standardized non-distribution 
constraint known as “nonprofit law” is adopted. 
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contributed.  This structure also identifies a measurable output that 
defines a quality good and makes it possible to structure a transaction 
in such a way that the entrepreneur would keep any money left over 
after the set quantity of water is provided to the agreed-upon number 
of African villagers. 
Malani and Posner argue that the compensation in their hypo-
thetical would not be permitted to a nonprofit firm under nonprofit 
law,
179
 and by extension, it would be easy to assume that the compen-
sation described in the second example would also not be permitted.  
In their conclusion, Malani and Posner make a compromise pro-
posal: “[I]f one is uncomfortable with giving for-profits access to 
nonprofits’ tax breaks, a compromise may be to allow nonprofits to 
access for-profits’ incentives.”
180
  They argue that the IRS should “re-
lax the restriction” on nonprofit managers’ compensation that does 
not allow nonprofit managers to “receive incentive pay keyed to the 
profits, to the revenues, or perhaps even to the costs of operating the 
organization.”
181
 
In fact, however, while the Internal Revenue Code probably re-
stricts compensation tied directly to the profits or revenues of a non-
profit firm, output-specific variable compensation structures are both 
theoretically consistent with the non-distribution constraint and per-
mitted under current law for nonprofit managers.  In other words, 
the incentive compensation structure described in the Malani-Posner 
hypothetical and in my extension of it is permitted under current law.  
Structures based on true profits are not permitted.  This distinction 
under current law makes perfect sense as an expression of the agen-
cy-cost analysis of the government’s provision of tax benefits for char-
ities. 
In this Part, I discuss briefly the ways in which current law does 
not conform to the simple distinction between for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations described by Malani and Posner.  This is important be-
cause if current law permits the kind of  efficiency-enhancing com-
pensation structures that Malani and Posner associate only with for-
profit firms, then the argument in favor of reforming the law to ex-
pand the tax-subsidies provided to for-profit firms is even less persua-
sive.
182
  It is also important because the agency-cost analysis presented 
 
 179 See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019 (“Unfortunately, under current law, 
the Entrepreneur cannot establish her charity as a nonprofit organization.”). 
 180 Id. at 2065. 
 181 Id. 
 182 It is also true that tax-deductible contributions can be provided to true for-
profit firms providing charitable goods as long as some charitable intermediary is 
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in this Article provides a principled method for determining which 
incentive-pay structures should be permitted to charitable organiza-
tions.  Good pay structures are those in which managers’ pay is tied to 
some measurable output so that managers’ compensation cannot be 
increased by reducing the quality of the charitable good provided.  If a 
manager can increase her compensation by reducing the quality of 
the good provided—as is the case when compensation is tied directly 
to profits or revenues—agency costs will simply be too high when the 
product is largely invisible to the donors and the government.  Thus, 
to the degree to which current law draws the line between compensa-
tion tied to measurable output and compensation tied to profits, it 
draws the line in the correct place.  Even more importantly, to the ex-
tent that there is ambiguity in the law—and there is plenty—this 
agency-cost method should provide a guide for decisions about what 
compensation structures to permit.  This method can be used by do-
nors, by charity boards of directors, by the IRS in administering the 
law, and by critics or reformers of current law. 
Malani and Posner argue that nonprofit organizations must pay 
their managers fixed salaries, and only for-profit firms are permitted 
to pay their managers profits-based compensation.
183
  This bilateral 
distinction does not adequately model reality, however.  In fact, it is 
 
used.  This is easily accomplished.  A nonprofit charity that meets the requirements 
of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 is created, and it accepts tax-deductible contributions.  It 
then takes the money contributed and contracts with a for-profit provider for the 
charitable goods.  There is nothing impermissible about a charitable nonprofit or-
ganization providing charitable goods by contracting with a for-profit supplier.  So, 
for example, an organization whose purpose is to provide water to African children 
could contract with for-profit partners who will build the wells or do the actual sup-
plying.  These contracts would presumably be only subject to the “private benefit” 
restrictions, and thus it would be the obligation of the charity’s board to ensure that 
it used reasonable diligence in determining that its contract is a fair one and that 
charitable assets are not wasted.  Thus, while it is true that retail-level individual do-
nors may not make tax-deductible donations to for-profit firms, tax-exempt organiza-
tions (both private foundations and the so-called public charities) are permitted to 
funnel the money raised through tax-deductible contributions to for-profit firms 
providing charitable services.  Malani and Posner briefly address a structure similar 
to this possibility under the rubric of “sophisticated legal manipulation” that could 
permit tax benefits for contributions to for-profit firms.  Id. at 2056.  They argue that 
this solution is not sufficient because it does not permit the manager of the nonprofit 
to be compensated with a profits interest in the for-profit firm.  Id. at 2057.  While 
this is plausible as a matter of law, it is not clear why it is a compelling objection.  The 
managers or directors of the nonprofit act as monitors and guarantors of the chari-
table interests of the donors and others, but they are not the people whose purpose 
or expertise is to find efficiency gains in delivering those goods.  That is the job of 
the manager of the for-profit, who can be compensated with a profits interest in the 
for-profit firm.      
 183 Id. at 2024. 
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more useful to describe the entrepreneur’s possible compensation 
options under current law as a pole with “fixed” salary on one end 
and “profits” on the other end.  In the middle is a range of compen-
sation options that may be called “incentive pay.”  A “fixed” salary 
means that the entrepreneur gets paid the same amount no matter 
what she does—her salary is presumably fixed at the beginning of her 
relationship with the donors, so neither she nor they know yet what 
types of cost-saving mechanisms she may find or invent.  A “profit-
based” salary means that her pay varies based only on the difference 
between the total amount of money the firm takes in (presumably 
from donations in the case of donative nonprofits) and the total 
amount spent on health for African children and any other adminis-
trative costs of providing that health (this difference is called “prof-
its”).
184
  But “incentive pay” means anything between these two ex-
tremes. Thus, between the “fixed” compensation structure and the 
“profits-based” compensation structure are various “incentive” com-
pensation structures that tie compensation to identifiable outcomes 
other than profits. 
The tax law governing permissible compensation for organiza-
tions that receive tax-deductible contributions can be confusing, par-
tially because the law is different depending on whether the compen-
sated individual is a “disqualified person” or not.
185
  But, generally, 
even if the entrepreneur is a disqualified person, she may pay herself 
a variable salary based on some quantifiable factor other than net 
profits.
186
  If certain procedural safeguards are implemented, the 
 
 
 
 185 Generally, a “disqualified person” with respect to a public charity is “any per-
son who was . . . in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.”  26 U.S.C. § 4958(f) (2006).     
 186 Generally, punitive excise taxes may be levied against organizations that en-
gage in an “excess benefit transaction,” which is defined as “any transaction in which 
an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization . . . to or 
for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided 
exceeds the value of the consideration . . . received for providing such benefit.”  § 
4958(c)(1)(A).  In other words, excessive compensation may result in excise taxes, but 
reasonable compensation will not.  Reasonable compensation is defined as “the 
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises . . . under 
like circumstances.”  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2012).  If a compensation 
structure is defined as “fixed” for the purposes of the regulations, then the relevant 
time for determining reasonableness is the date the parties enter into the contract. 
Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(2)(i).  But a “fixed” compensation structure does not mean one in 
which the total amount of compensation is negotiated in advance.  Rather, “fixed 
payment means an amount of cash or other property specified in a contract, or deter-
mined by a fixed formula specified in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in ex-
change for the provision of the specified services.”  Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A) (em-
LEFF_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  11:05 AM 
872 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:819 
charity may even rely on a rebuttable presumption that the compen-
sation paid to the entrepreneur is reasonable even if the compensa-
tion varies based on some measurable output and even if the entre-
preneur is a “disqualified person.”
187
  Commentators have also noted 
that incentive compensation arrangements are permissible, so long as 
variable pay is tied to some metric of performance.
188
 
For example, take Malani and Posner’s hypothetical.
189
  The do-
nors and the entrepreneur agreed that the donors would pay one 
hundred dollars, of which eighty would go directly to the benefit of 
the African children.  If the entrepreneur can figure out how to re-
 
phasis added).  The “fixed formula” may relate to future contingencies, “provided 
that no person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or de-
ciding whether to make a payment (such as a bonus).”  Id.  Thus, a compensation 
structure in which the entrepreneur is paid a variable amount based on some quanti-
fiable factor would be a “fixed” compensation structure and would be permitted so 
long as the amount that was expected to be paid was “reasonable” at the time the 
contract was entered into.  For example, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-01030 (Jan. 6, 
2006), the IRS found that a certain incentive compensation arrangement in which 
compensation was tied to meeting specific performance objectives did not constitute 
inurement.  See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39674 (Jun. 17, 1987); I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 38905 (Jun. 11, 1982); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38283 (Feb. 15, 1980).  
But see People of God Cmty. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980) (holding that 
a “percentage-of-gross-tithes” method of fixing compensation constituted private in-
urement); Gemological Inst. of Am. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1604, 1609 (1952) 
(holding that compensation measured as a percentage of “net earnings” constituted 
private inurement). 
 187 Generally, a rebuttable presumption in favor of reasonableness is created if (1) 
the compensation arrangement is “approved in advance by an authorized body . . . 
composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest,” (2) “the au-
thorized body obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability” of the 
compensation arrangement, and (3) “the authorized body adequately documented 
the basis for its determination concurrently with making that determination.”  Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2011).  Of these, the only difficult requirement is that the or-
ganization obtain “appropriate data as to comparability” to support a compensation 
arrangement in which payments vary based on some measure of output.  But so long 
as other organizations (nonprofit or for-profit) are paying their management in this 
way, it is permissible for a nonprofit charity to pay in this way.       
 188 See, e.g., Peter Frumkin, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 425, 434 (1999) (“[I]f compensation fluctuates, the organization should be able 
to attribute the fluctuation’s relationship to the employee’s performance.”); Sandra 
B. Richtermeyer & Gary Fleischman, Planning Strategies to Avoid Intermediate Sanctions, 
36 TAX ADVISER 424, 431 (2005) (“The use of incentive compensation is becoming 
more popular, particularly as nonprofit organizations compete with the private sec-
tor for executive talent.  It is critical to link incentive or bonus pay to specified identi-
fiable goods (such as organizational performance), particularly for highly paid exec-
utive directors or officers.”).  See generally Brody, supra note 16, at 494 (“[T]he law 
generally permits competitive returns to labor; the non-distribution constraint bars 
only returns to equity capital.”). 
 189 For previous discussion of this hypothetical, see supra notes 119–21 and ac-
companying text. 
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duce the indirect administrative costs of providing water without re-
ducing the money used directly in Africa, then she can keep one 
hundred percent of the savings in administrative costs.
190
  Malani and 
Posner posit that a compensation structure in which the entrepre-
neur can keep any of the remaining twenty dollars not spent on ad-
ministrative costs would not be permissible for a nonprofit organiza-
tion.
191
  But actually, under current law, an incentive-pay structure 
that identified some reasonable amount of administrative costs and 
permitted the entrepreneur to keep any savings in administrative 
costs as their own compensation would likely be permitted.
192
 
This compensation structure would not be a per se violation of 
the non-distribution constraint.  Rather, it would have to be evaluated 
to determine whether it is reasonable compensation for the entre-
preneur’s services.  This analysis would presumably begin with the 
“rebuttable presumption” provided under Section 53.4958 of the 
Treasury Regulations, in which an independent committee of the 
board would make a determination of the compensation structure, 
document it, and gather evidence that the overall structure is compa-
rable to compensation arrangements made elsewhere.
193
  Then, as 
long as the compensation structure is reasonable overall, the fact that 
it is tied to some objective measure of success, such as reducing ad-
ministrative costs above what was previously expected, would not in 
any way be problematic for a nonprofit charity. 
The binary opposition proposed by Malani and Posner is mis-
leading, and the situation described in their own hypothetical, once 
fleshed out, is equally available under current law to for-profit and 
nonprofit charities.  What distinguishes this permissible incentive-pay 
structure from an impermissible profits interest?  Nothing more than 
the fact that the firm has identified a measure of success—an outcome that is 
not tied to net profits of the firm.  That measure of success is the reduc-
tion in administrative costs associated with the particular project. 
 
 190 Presumably, they would also agree that her compensation would be reduced by 
any cost she incurs over the predicted administrative costs. 
 191 See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019.  In this regard, Malani and Posner’s 
claim that the IRS will not permit nonprofit managers to receive compensation tied 
to the costs of operating an organization appears to be just wrong.  See id. at 2065 
(“[T]he IRS does not permit managers who exercise control over a nonprofit to re-
ceive incentive pay keyed to . . . perhaps even to the costs of operating the organiza-
tion.”).  They provide no authority to support the claim, and it appears to be incon-
sistent with current law. 
 192 As discussed supra note 112, it is unlikely the donors would permit the entre-
preneur to keep 100% of the efficiency gains.  She would likely have to split some 
portion of the gains with the donors in some way. 
 193 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4 (2002). 
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Malani and Posner’s hypothetical replicated the non-distribution 
constraint under private contract terms, so it is not surprising that it 
is permissible under current law.  But what if the organization identi-
fied a measurable output as a definition of a quality product and 
compensated a CEO who managed to outperform the predicted cost 
of providing quality products?  In this case as well, current law per-
mits incentive-pay structures for organizational managers.  Imagine 
that the organization promised that for each one hundred collected, 
water would be provided to one hundred additional African children 
and that it had solved the “non-divisibility” problem in some way so it 
was easy and cost-effective to verify that each additional dollar con-
tributed would provide water for an additional unique African child.  
Imagine that the organization decided to provide incentive compen-
sation to its CEO and agreed that if the CEO could provide water for 
the same number of African children at less than one dollar per 
child, then she could keep the savings. 
Again, in this case, current law would probably permit the pro-
posed incentive-compensation arrangement.  Again, the analysis 
would begin with the “rebuttable presumption,” under which an in-
dependent committee of the board would gather evidence that the 
overall structure is comparable to compensation arrangements made 
elsewhere, make a compensation contract prior to paying compensa-
tion, and document everything.
194
  Then, as long as the presumption 
is not rebutted, the compensation would not be problematic.  Again, 
the fact that compensation is tied to meeting some performance 
goals, like providing water to a certain number of additional children 
per dollar spent, would be entirely acceptable under nonprofit law. 
Then, in at least these cases, the permissible “incentive” pay 
structure provides all the benefits of the “profit” pay structure pro-
posed by Malani and Posner.  But these are not pure “for-profit” 
compensation structures.  In neither case can the entrepreneur keep 
any money not spent on providing water to African children.  Instead, 
in both cases some measurable output is identified, and the entre-
preneur can only keep money left over after providing charitable 
goods of a quality that can be measured. 
As discussed above,
195
 this is an unusual situation in the provision 
of charitable goods.
196
  More often, the provision of charitable goods 
 
 194 See id. 
 195 See supra Part II.B.4.  
 196 The fact that incentive-pay structures are not more widely used by charities, 
despite the fact that they are permissible under current law, supports the observation 
that the ability to measure success in observable ways is unusual.  As discussed supra 
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will be accompanied by more pervasive contract failure.  That is, the 
costs associated with identifying and monitoring the provision of 
measurable high-quality goods will overwhelm any potential savings 
to be derived from such incentive-pay arrangements. 
As discussed above, if the entrepreneur’s pay was not tied to 
some measurable outcome—like savings in administrative costs—but 
instead was tied to net profits alone, the entrepreneur could simply 
provide less benefit and keep the money.  If she found that she could 
provide water to one hundred percent of the children in the village 
for ninety dollars (keeping her predicted ten dollar fee) or that she 
could provide water to only fifty percent of the children for seventy 
dollars (bumping her compensation to a healthy thirty dollars), then 
there would be nothing in the for-profit structure that would prevent 
her from doing so.  In other words, if a “high quality product” cannot 
be defined, or if effective means of monitoring and enforcing the 
quality of the product cannot be implemented, then the profits-pay 
structure will usually be unattractive to the donor. 
Malani and Posner create a hypothetical to illustrate why a prof-
its-based structure may sometimes be preferable to a nonprofit struc-
ture, but in so doing, they create a structure that is permissible for 
nonprofits under current law.  An actual for-profits structure, one in 
which the entrepreneur really has access to the net profits of the 
firm, unconstrained by some mechanism to restrict her compensation 
to some measurable output, would result in an obviously unaccepta-
ble cost—the unprotected risk of the entrepreneur profiting from 
providing a low-quality product.  The fact that incentive-pay struc-
tures are consistent with the non-distribution constraint under cur-
rent law suggests that there are unlikely to be many situations in 
which a donor accurately identifies a situation in which the most effi-
cient transaction structure is a for-profits model.  In this case, if a do-
nor chose the for-profit structure, the government would be reasona-
ble to deny a tax deduction for such a contribution. 
But more importantly, this line between incentive-pay structures, 
in which compensation is tied to some identifiable output measure, 
and profits-based pay structures, in which compensation is tied to the 
difference between revenue and costs, not only describes the line 
drawn by current law but it also provides a principled method of as-
 
Part II.B.3, donors generally do not have good information about the best means to 
improve the health of African children or what the competing costs and benefits may 
be.  They do not know the types of cost savings that the entrepreneur may institute 
because they do not know what the reasonable costs for providing the services they 
seek would be.  Instead, they rely on a fixed salary and the non-distribution con-
straint to secure the most efficient transaction structure.  
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certaining what compensation structures should be permitted in char-
itable organizations.  Thus, the IRS could expand its guidance on 
managerial compensation building on the insights presented here.  
The key is whether a compensation scheme enables managerial com-
pensation to be increased when the managers reduce quality.  Those 
compensation structures that are most likely to permit such enrich-
ment by quality reduction, like a pure profits interest, should be pro-
hibited since they do not advance the government’s interest in the ef-
ficient use of its tax subsidies for charitable goods.  The agency-cost 
focus also highlights the importance of the government identifying 
those persons who share its interest in high-quality charitable goods.  
Charity managers who stand to increase their compensation by reduc-
ing product quality do not share the government’s interest.
197
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
If the current law is generally adequate in the way it deals with 
the non-distribution constraint and its effect on manager compensa-
tion, then what justifies this Article?  What is it about the claim that 
“tax breaks” for charitable goods should be “decoupled” from the 
non-distribution constraint that demands such an extensive reply?  
The primary answer is that Malani and Posner’s attempted “refuta-
tion” of the so-called agency theory provides a timely opportunity to 
expand that theory and to investigate its application to decisions 
about how to compensate the managers of the providers of public 
and third-party goods.  In short, the conclusion of the first part of this 
Article is that donors to charitable goods’ providers are probably 
choosing the most efficient mechanism to deliver such goods when 
they choose to provide them through nonprofit organizations, de-
spite any efficiency costs of providing them in such form. 
But the implications of the agency theory are wider than simply 
justifying the donors’ choice of providing charitable goods through 
nonprofit providers in most circumstances.  Rather, this Article also 
proposes some criteria for evaluating incentive-pay arrangements by 
charities, nonprofit or otherwise.  The agency-cost analysis described 
in this Article should provide a useful guide to anyone making deci-
sions about whether incentive compensation arrangements are effi-
 
 197 As I have pointed out elsewhere, this attention to the government’s agency 
costs may justify the IRS’s interest in whether a charity has an “independent” govern-
ing board or other “independent” stakeholders.  See Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal 
Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a “Middle 
Way,”  99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011). 
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ciency promoting or inefficient.  If a performance measure can be 
identified and monitored at a sufficiently low cost, then tying manag-
er compensation to that measure may be efficiency enhancing.  That 
is, efficiency may be enhanced so long as the manager cannot enrich 
herself by shirking on quality of product.  When the product is altru-
ism or has an altruistic or public-good aspect, then the quality of the 
product is likely to be expensive to monitor or measure, and thus 
managers may well have an opportunity to cut costs by reducing qual-
ity.  Performance measures that enable them to enrich themselves by 
cutting costs at the expense of quality are likely to be inefficient.  A 
pure profits interest in a firm, in which compensation is tied directly 
to the difference between revenue and costs, enables managers to in-
crease their compensation by cutting costs in ways that directly im-
pact product quality.  That is why true for-profit charities are ineffi-
cient. 
But Malani and Posner’s argument about tax benefits also pro-
vides the opportunity to enlarge the agency theory to explain why 
donors who are tempted to choose to provide such goods through 
for-profit providers should be denied tax benefits for that choice.  
The government has its own agency costs to worry about, and it is rea-
sonable for the government to provide a single standard that will 
most often maximize the efficiency of providing charitable goods 
through tax benefits.  This is especially true because there are plausi-
ble explanations why the government might be suspicious of donors 
seeking tax benefits for the provision of charitable goods through for-
profit firms.  The goal of the tax law of charitable organizations, then, 
should be to provide a standard set of rules that constrain the com-
pensation of the managers of charitable firms that maximize the effi-
ciency of the government’s provision of charitable goods through tax 
incentives.  The current state of the law, which permits incentive 
compensation arrangements so long as they are tied to some metric 
(some output measure) other than profits or revenues, conforms well 
to the intuitions formed by thinking through what the agency theory 
predicts.  In addition, to the degree to which the standard under cur-
rent law will be further clarified and developed, agency theory sug-
gests that the key factor in deciding whether incentive-pay structures 
are efficiency enhancing is whether product quality can be identified 
and monitored in a cost-efficient way by someone whose interest lies 
in maximizing product quality.  If it cannot, then managers may be 
incentivized to reduce quality.  It is in the government’s interest to 
prevent those types of incentive-pay arrangements. 
Finally, I mentioned in the introduction that the non-
distribution constraint affects the way both providers of labor and 
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providers of capital are compensated.  This Article has focused on 
justifying the non-distribution constraint’s limitation of compensa-
tion for providers of labor.  But an adequate treatment of whether 
the non-distribution constraint’s limitation on providers of capital is 
justified under an agency cost analysis is still to be performed.  The 
reasoning of this Article suggests that providers of capital must be 
denied a true profits interest in charitable firms receiving tax benefits 
if they have any control rights over the operation or management of 
the firm.  If “ownership” and “control” could be separated in a truly 
fundamental way, then it is possible that providers of capital could be 
compensated with the profits of a firm without risking excessive losses 
from shirking on quality.  It is unlikely that people would want to 
provide capital under these circumstances, again because of agency 
costs, but a full-scale exploration of this possibility is warranted. 
 
